University of Miami Law School

Institutional Repository
University of Miami Inter-American Law Review

10-1-2009

Federal Forfeiture and Money Laundering: Undue
Deference to Legal Fictions and the Canadian
Crossroads
Max M. Nelson

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Max M. Nelson, Federal Forfeiture and Money Laundering: Undue Deference to Legal Fictions and the Canadian Crossroads, 41 U. Miami
Inter-Am. L. Rev. 43 (2009)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr/vol41/iss1/4

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami InterAmerican Law Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.

43

NOTES
Federal Forfeiture and Money Laundering:
Undue Deference to Legal Fictions and
the Canadian Crossroads
Max M. Nelson*
I.

II.

111.

INTRODUCTION

43

.........................................

A. Statutory and Historical Background............
B. Attacking the System .........................
C. Prosecutorial Tactics..........................

47
47
51
60

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES ................................

64

HISTORY, MECHANICS, AND CURRENT STATE OF

LAW.

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.

Proper Constitutional Interpretation............ 64
Fifth Amendment Due Process ..................
70
Fourth Amendment Seizure....................
79
Sixth Amendment Counsel ....................
79
First Amendment Speech......................
82
Eighth Amendment Fines .....................
83
IV. THE CANADrIAN IMPACT .................................
85
A. Background: the CanadianLegal System .........
85
B. Provincial Forfeiture Law .....................
87
C. Chatterjee: Civil Law by Contortion .............
90
V. IF IT's BROKEN, Fix IT: AMERICAN SOLUTIONS ..........
95
A. Transparency and Fee Applications.............. 95
B. Revise and Codify Prosecutors'Manuals .........
98
C. Blanket Criminalization...................... 100
D. Judicial Duty ...............................
101
I.

INTRODUCTION

"We hope to make it impossible for any drug dealer to hire a
*Student
and Articles & Comments Editor, Inter-American Law Review,
University of Miami School of Law. B.A., University of Michigan. Thank you to
Professors Ricardo J. Bascuas and Bruce J. Winick for advice regarding American law
and already writing thoughtful and comprehensive articles on the general topic.
Thank you also to Anthony Price, counsel for intervener, British Columbia Civil
Liberties Association in the Chatterjee case, for guidance on the current state of
Canadian law and clarifying key distinctions between Americani and Canadian legal
systems.
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lawyer."' This sentiment was communicated to Miami defense
attorney Neal Sonnett by an anonymous senior Justice Department official and should disturb those who value the presumption
of innocence and the Bill of Rights. At the point he is indicted, the
"drug dealer" is, of course, only a suspected drug dealer. Over the
past 40 years, Congress has dutifully responded to the consequences of an expanding illegal drug trade by passing legislation
aimed at hitting drug traffickers where it hurts most: the wallet.
Modern federal forfeiture and money laundering statutes have
enabled prosecutors to seize tainted money and other instruments
of illegality before convictions are obtained, and without adversarial probable cause hearings.
In order to arm law enforcement in the war on drugs, Congress codified certain legal fictions. Legal fictions are defined as
false assumptions treated as fact in the advancement of justice.
They are not necessarily controversial. Treating corporations as
"persons"~ for legal purposes is an example of a non-controversial,
generally accepted and often used legal fiction. However, two
legal fictions created to advance the government's so-called war on
drugs undermine the principles of the United States Constitution.
The first is the "relation back" fiction: that title in all forfeitable
property vests in the government the instant a crime is committed.' Both opponents and proponents of federal forfeiture law recognize relation back's fictive status,3 but its opponents have
rightly noted that it contradicts core principles of American criminal justice, which deem a suspect innocent until proven guilty and
require the government to prove every element of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.' Nevertheless, in 1970, the Court narrowly
1. Julie Kay, Heat is on Attorneys in Drug Trafficking Cases, MIAMI DAILY Bus.
May 25, 2001, available at http://www.truthinjustice.org/drug-defenders.htm;
see also Scott Michaels, Money-Laundering Prosecution Worries Lawyers: Rare Case
Prompts Criticism That Government Is Attempting to Intimidate Counsel, ABC NEWS,
July 22, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=5421 119&page=l (" [According
to former United States Attorney Kendall Coffey,] [tihere are those in the Justice
Department who believe that serious drug dealers and other serious criminals should
not have access to top-flight lawyers.").
2. See, e.g., Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 627
(1989) (White, J., majority) ("[Tihe so-called relation-back provision [dictates that] all
right, title and interest in property obtained by criminals via the illicit means..
vests in the United States upon the commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture.")
(internal quotation omitted).
3. Compare United States v. Bissell, 866 F.2d 1343, 1350-51 (11th Cir. 1989)
with Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 641 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (combining
a dissent for both Monsanto and Caplin & Drysdale).
4. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) ("The reasonable-doubt
REV.,
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blessed the fiction by a 5-4 vote. In a well-reasoned dissent by
Justice Blackmun, who observed that pre-conviction forfeiture
interferes with a defendant's ability to secure counsel of choice
and a fair trial, the issue was framed as "whether Congress may
use this wholly fictive device of property law to cut off th [e] fundamental right[s] of the accused in a criminal case."'
The second controversial legal fiction allows anthropomorphic
in rem forfeiture's unjust extension into criminal matters. The fiction supporting in rem forfeiture allows the government to seize
an object on account of its illegal behavior, circumventing the
criminal procedural protections that are triggered by in personam
confrontation between the government and the object's owner,
who is often punished through deprivation of property. Like corporate entity status, the fictions allowing current money laundering and forfeiture practice have been codified, but this fact does
not exempt them from constitutional scrutiny by Article III courts,
presently derelict in their duty.' This failure has armed prosecutors whom we cannot blame for adopting the mantra, "whatever
works is alright."' Prosecutors are not at fault for using the tools
at their disposal; effective litigators should use every allowable
advantage to achieve a desired result. The current problem centers on the tactics allowed by the federal courts.
In the past decade, the more populous Canadian provinces
have enacted civil forfeiture legislation aimed at crushing a growing criminal drug trade.' These relatively new laws emulate
American federal law by adopting the relation back fiction and
bypassing criminal defendant protections by fusing lax civil law
standard plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal procedure..
[providing] concrete substance for the presumption of innocence . . . .)
5. See Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 652 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
6. See id. at 644 ("That the majority implicitly finds the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel of choice so insubstantial that it can be outweighed by a legal fiction
demonstrates . .. its apparent unawareness of the function of the independent lawyer
as the guardian of our freedom.") (internal quotation omitted).
7. See Bill Moushey, Out of Control: Legal Rules Have Changed, Allowing

Federal Agents, Prosecutors to Bypass Basic Rights, Prrr.

POST-GAZETTE,

Nov. 22,

1998, at Al; see also Max D. Stem & David Hoffman, Privileged Informers: The
Attorney Subpoena Problem and a Proposalfor Reform, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1783, 1787
(1988) (depicting the prosecutorial tactics of Justice Department Officials during the
Reagan administration, enabled by recently enacted prosecutor-friendly federal
statutes); see also Aviva Abramovsky, Comment, Traitors in our Midst: Attorneys who
Inform on Their Clients, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 676, 686 (2000).
8. See, e.g., Ontario Remedies for Organized Crime and Other Unlawful
Activities Act, 2001 S.O., ch. 28 [hereinafter Civil Remedies Act]; Alberta Victims
Restitution and Compensation Payment Act, 2001 S.A., ch. V-3.5.
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concepts into criminal matters.' In Canada's form of federalism,
criminal law and procedure is a federal matter, while civil law is
left to the provinces. The Canadian Supreme Court recently
decided Chatterjee, a jurisdictional challenge to Canada's provincial "civil" forfeiture laws.'" The appellants in Chatterjee argued
that given the many criminal and punishment-related aspects of
"civil" forfeiture laws, they are ultra vires of provincial legislative
power, offering an interesting corollary to related American law
regarding forfeiture.
What Constitutional right does a drug smuggler have to use
the fruits of his illegal activity to hire a lawyer?"' None according
to the Supreme Court, because the relation back fiction allows the
government to label him a "drug smuggler" before he is convicted.
The in rem forfeiture fiction then allows the government to seize
the alleged proceeds and instrumentalities through civil means
without affording the alleged drug smuggler the ordinary procedural protections common in seizure hearings. To be faithful to the
Constitution however, the question should be rephrased to ask:
what Constitutional right does a suspected drug smuggler have to
use the alleged fruits of his illegal activity to hire a lawyer? If the
government cannot establish probable cause to seize the stolen
money as evidence in the ensuing case, the presumptively innocent defendant has an absolute right to do so under the Sixth
Amendment. Currently, however, courts allow the government to
restrain allegedly dirty assets on the basis of "reasonable belief," a
standard easier for the government to meet than probable cause.
Moreover, unlike probable cause hearings, many forfeiture hearings occur ex parte, thereby preventing the defendant from contesting the government's attainment of this minimal burden of
proof. Although the framers did not view a deprivation of property to be as serious as a deprivation of liberty, they understood
that property preserves other core rights. Forfeiture itself is not as
problematic as rights deprived as a result. Procedural rules must
9. Compare Criminal Forfeitures, 21 U.S.C. § 853 (2006) with Civil Remedies
Act, supra note 8.
10. Chatteijee v. Att'y Gen. of Ontario, File 32204, 2009 S.C.C. 19 (Apr. 17, 2009),
available at http://csc.lexum.umontreal.caen/2009/2009sccl9/2009sccl9.html. Since
the completion of this law review article, the Canadian Supreme Court heard the case
and affirmed the Ontario Court of Appeal's decision, holding the Civil Remedies Act's
forfeiture provision to be constitutional. Id.
11. See Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 626; see also Ricardo J. Bascuas, Of
Defense Lawyers and Pornographers: Pretrial Asset Seizures and the Fourth
Amendment, 62 U. Mi~ivi L. REV. 1159, 1164 (2008) (discussing a similar issue and
collecting sources utilizing the same basic question).
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be applied with an even hand and interpreted to protect the innocent and the presumption of innocence; if not, the very principals
upon which our country was founded evaporate.
This article argues that the courts' undue deference to the
relation back and in rem legal fictions, as applied in criminalrelated matters, has unjustly averted fair First, Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth and Eighth Amendment scrutiny. Furthermore, these fictions have had international implications by enabling similar
abuses in Canada. Part 11 describes the historical background of
federal statutes relating to forfeiture and money laundering, the
Court's conception of the constitutional status of these laws, and
how these prosecutorial tools are used in practice. Part III argues
that the current Constitutional edifice supporting forfeiture and
money laundering in circumstances that should trigger ordinary
criminal defendant procedural protections is buttressed by flimsy
legal fictions, violating the original intention of the First, Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendments of the Constitution. Part
IV compares current American law in this area with recently
enacted civil forfeiture laws in Canadian provinces and the jurisdictional challenge of these laws in the Chatterjee case, forecasting
the social and legal effects of its disposition. Part V suggests ways
that Congress, the courts and law enforcement officials can
achieve crime-fighting objectives within the bounds of law.

II.
A.

HISTRiY, MECHANICS, AND CURRENT STATE OF LAW

Statutory and HistoricalBackground

In 1970, faced with a mounting American social problem arising from organized crime and the illegal drug trade, Congress took
a major step into the criminal arena, an area of the law mostly
confined to the states before then, and passed the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO) 12 and the Continuing Criminal Enterprise Statute ("CCE").13 These expansive
12. Title lIX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452,

§ 901(a), 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2006))
(stating that a RICO conviction requires the government to establish that the
defendant has exhibited a "pattern," meaning two or more instances, of
"racketeering," consisting of a broad host of violent, drug-related or white collar
crimes); see also Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 27 (1983) (pointing out that
RICO is the only federal criminal statute expressly intended to be interpreted
liberally to effectuate its crucial law enforcement purpose).
13. Title Il of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 408, 84 Stat. 1265 (1970) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§ 848 (2006)) (requiring the government to establish that a defendant derive
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federal statutes contained in personam, "criminal" forfeiture provisions in the attempt to paralyze the flow of dirty money."4 The
criminal forfeiture provision has been utilized in just one act since
the Constitution was ratified." Criminal forfeiture, not to be confused with "civil" in rem forfeiture, involves an interaction
between the government and a defendant, and initially meant
that the defendant was to forfeit profits connected with criminal
activity upon conviction.'" Civil forfeiture involves an interaction
between the sovereign and a piece of ill-gotten property, legally
distinct from its owner, who technically suffers no criminal penalty or punishment from his deprivation therefrom."
Cognizant of the fact that RICO and CCE defendants were
hiding ill-gotten gains elsewhere before their conviction, serving
"substantial income" in the capacity of a drug-related enterprise in concert with five
or more people).
14. See 21 U.S.C. § 853; see also Bruce J. Winick, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees
Under RICO and CCE and the Right to Counsel of Choice: The Constitutional
Dilemma and How to Avoid It, 43 U. Mixivi L. REV. 765, 766-71 (1989) (providing a
more thorough background on the advent and purpose of criminal forfeiture); see also
21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(B) (stating that federal forfeiture law contains a "bonn fide
purchaser" provision which provides that those without reasonable cause to believe
that assets were subject to forfeiture may recoup losses; however, the burden is on the
defendant and an acquittal of a criminal charge does not necessarily mean that a
party victimized by a civil forfeiture will be able to regain property since an acquittal
only means that the government has not established guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt).
15. See Confiscation Act of 1862, 12 Stat. 589 (1862) (authorizing the seizure of
Confederate soldier estates); see also Winick, supra note 14, at 768; see also Robert G.
Morvillo & Barry A. Bohrer, Checking the Balance: ProsecutorialPower in an Age of
Expansive Legislation, 32 Amv.CRIm. L. REV. 137, 145-46 (1995) ("Prior to 1970,
forfeiture . .. was virtually unutilized in the federal system . . . [tioday, forfeiture is
one of the most powerful weapons in the government's arsenal, with over 100 statutes
providing for the forfeiture of property implicated in criminal activity.").
16. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(a)(2)(A) (requiring forfeiture of "profits" in CCE cases);
compare with 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1970) (allowing jury determination of defendant's
forfeitable "interest" in criminal proceeds in RICO cases); see also Forfeitures, 21
U.S.C. § 881 (2002) (permitting the forfeiture of contraband).
17. The distinction between civil and criminal forfeiture under current American
law is rather opaque, and it is often difficult to determine whether forfeiture
constitutes a criminal penalty. Focusing on the subject matter of a particular case
will not determine whether civil or criminal forfeiture is occurring. When faced with
a criminal suspect in possession of ill-gained property, the government can elect to
commence either civil or criminal forfeiture proceedings contingent on strategic
concerns beyond the scope of this article. Adding to the complication are the various
aspects of civil forfeiture that appear by common sense to be punishment or
criminally related. For example, the "innocent owner" defense of civil forfeiture
suggests that the alternative is a "guilty owner." This structure is a result of the
fiction that in rem forfeiture is purely about the property itself, independent from its
owner, which is necessary for the government to prevent criminal Bill of Rights
protections (which apply to human beings only) from triggering.
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time and moving right back into their tacky mansions, Congress
reacted. It first passed the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act ("the
CFA") in 1984.18 The CFA permitted the government to seek a
restraining order on a defendant's assets before issuing an indictment, borrowing the relation back fiction that title to property
vests in the sovereign at the time of illegality."9 The unprecedented borrowing of a civil property fiction into the criminal
law-an area with heavy Bill of Rights implications, including the
reasonable doubt standard-would later have profound
implications. 0
Next, Congress passed the Money Laundering Control Act of
1986 ("the MLCA") in an attempt to restrain the flow and concealment of drug trade proceeds, for the first time criminalizing activities of those who are knowingly involved in the flow of dirty
money."' Section 1956 of the MLCA criminalized conduct necessarily related to concealing assets, whereas 1957 greatly expanded
traditional notions of money laundering's definition, prohibiting
"knowingly engag[ing] or attempt ling] to engage in a monetary
transaction in criminally derived property ...derived from specified unlawful activity.""2 Given the connection between forfeiture
and the new substantive money laundering offense, the Department of Justice created a single unit within its Criminal Division,
the Asset Forfeiture & Money Laundering Section. Money laundering was added to the list of crimes constituting a RICO offense
and the money laundering statute was amended in 1988, allowing
the government to seek forfeiture of all property "involved in"
laundering." The circuits have split on how broadly to read the
18. Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 301-323, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 18, 19, 21, 26 & 28 U.S.C.); see Winick, supra note 14, at 769
n.21.
19. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) ("All right, title and interest in property ... vests in the
United States upon the commission of the act giving nise to forfeiture under this
section . . ."); 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (same); see also United States v. Bissell, 866 F.2d
1343, 1349 (11th Cir. 1989) ("To preserve forfeitable assets for a possible conviction,
the district court may restrain the defendant from using these assets before trial.").
20. See David Fried, Rationalizing Criminal Forfeiture, 79 J. CRIM. L &
CRIMINOLOGY 328, 346 (1988) (establishing that the relation back provision's use in
criminal cases is without historical or legal support).
21. See Pub. L. No. 99-570, §1352(a), 100 Stat. 3207-18, 21 (1986) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957 (2009)); see also S. Rep. No. 99-433, at 4-5 (1986)
(quoting Vice President and then-Ranking Member of the Senate Judiciary
Committee Joe Biden, who called money laundering a "crucial financial underpinning
of organized crime and narcotics trafficking.").
22. See 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a) (1988).
23. See 18 U.S.C. § 982 (2007) (outlining criminal forfeiture mechanisms for
money laundering); see also 18 U.S.C. § 981 (2006) (outlining civil forfeiture
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"involved in" language. Some have adopted the "facilitation theory," meaning that an entire bank account with one million dollars
can be frozen upon the deposit of a few thousand dirty dollars,
since the bulk of the account is being used to facilitate the concealment of the smaller amount."4 Other circuits have adopted a narrower "substantial connection test," meaning that only the
portions of the bank account substantially connected to the underlying crime may be frozen.2 " It was initially feared that the expansive reach of the money laundering statutes, casting a wide net to
prevent sophisticated criminals aware of the loopholes that
restrictively-written legislation provided, would lead to congressionally unintended prosecutions .1 6 The only way to limit unintended prosecutions and convictions in such a broadly worded
statute is the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Given statutory
vagueness, prosecutorial power is more or less unfettered. Additionally, the judicial determination of the reach of "involved in"
has an impact not only upon alleged drug peddlers, but also upon
those financially connected in a facially legitimate capacity, such
as bankers and lawyers. The gross lack of uniformity in the realm
of federal money laundering law's reach requires further clarification by the Supreme Court, as the current lack of guidance serves
as a tacit allowance of inconsistent and abusive practices by law
enforcement.
mechanisms for money laundering). For a thorough analysis of issues resulting from
the broad reach of pre-conviction forfeiture for money laundering, see also Brian Fork,
The Federal Seizure of Attorneys' Fees in Criminal ForfeitureActions and the Threat
to the American System of Criminal Defense, 83 N.C. L. REV. 205, 216-37 (2004).
24. See, e.g., United States v. All Monies ($477,048.62) in Account No. 90-3617-3,
754 F. Supp. 1467 (D. Haw. 1991) (holding that property used to facilitate money
laundering is subject to forfeiture even though money laundering forfeiture statute
did not expressly use the word "facilitate"); see also George Chamberlain, What is
Considered Property "Involved In" Money Laundering Offense, and Thus Subject to
Civil or Criminal Forfeiture, for Purposes of the Money Laundering Control Act, 135
A.L.R. FED. 367 (1996).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Schifferli, 895 F.2d 987, 990 (1990) (holding that
there must be a substantial connection between the property and crime for forfeiture
to reach the property); see also Fork, supra note 23, at 220 n.146 (listing of cases
regarding same).
26. S. Rep. No. 99-433, at 6 (1986) (stating that The National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers [hereinafter NACDL] argued that crimes totally unrelated
to money laundering and overlapping with other crimes would be touched by the new
legislation, even presaging the impact a potentially low mens rea requirement would
have on defense lawyers in federal money laundering prosecutions); see also Morvillo,
supra note 15, at 143 (arguing that the federal prosecution of what would be a state
misdemeanor relating to sexual activities between adults as federal money
laundering was likely beyond Congress's intent).

20091
B.

2009]
FEDERAL FORFEITURE

5
51

Attacking the System

There is uncertainty on the issue of whether or not the federal
forfeiture and money laundering statutes were intended to reach
funds paid by criminal suspects to counsel for legal services. It is
most likely that Congress either did not contemplate that forfeiture law would prohibit cash flow to legitimate defense services, or
simply chose to defer to the federal courts.2 There is a footnote in
an earlier draft of the 1984 forfeiture amendments that states
"[nothing in this section is intended to interfere with a person's
sixth amendment right to counsel. 2 Such intent offers little help
since the Sixth Amendment is not a light switch that only Congress can turn on or off; defining the contours of the right to counsel is within the province of the federal courts, not Congress.
Before passage of section 1957 of the money laundering statutes,
there was much debate on whether to include a similar Sixth
Amendment exemption clause.2 Congress ultimately decided,
however, to forego the inclusion of such an exemption clause
within the legislation . 3 0 Nevertheless, at the behest of the Department of Justice, after much lobbying by the NACDL, section
1957(h) was enacted: "monetary transaction ... does not include
any transaction necessary to preserve a person's right to representation as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the ConstituSection 1956, prohibiting money laundering in the
tion."3
traditional sense of concealment, contains no such clause.
Although the forfeiture statutes do not directly address the
Sixth Amendment question, some federal courts recognized that
853(c)'s bona fide purchaser clause had the potential to protect
27. See Winick, supra note 15, at 849-50 (arguing that Congress was only
concerned with the flow of sham fees to attorneys).
28. H.R. Rep. No. 98-845, pt. 1, at 19 n.1 (1984); se Winick, supra note 14, at 849
n.411.
29. See D. Randall Johnson, The Criminally Derived Property Statute:
Constitutionaland Interpretive Issues Raised by 18 U.S.C. § 1957, 34 Wm. & MARY L.
REv. 1291, 1353-60 (discussing legislative history, congressional intent and effects of
the Sixth Amendment exemption of § 1957).
30. Id.
31. See Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1352(a), 100 Stat. 3207-18 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1957(f) (2009)); see also Johnson, supra note 29, at 1355 n.238, 1356 n.239
(noting that the exception was not the result of government capitulation, the DOJ
specified that the exception only extended for bona fide attorney's fees used for actual
services in connection with a criminal case and that an attorney could be prosecuted if
there is clear and convincing evidence that the attorney had actual knowledge of the
illegal origin of the specific property received and the knowledge was not gained
through confidential communications covered by attorney-client privilege).
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legitimate fees.3 The bona fide purchaser provision provides that,
"[amny person, other than the defendant, asserting a legal interest
in property which has been ordered forfeited .. . may. ... petition
the court for a hearing to adjudicate the validity of his alleged
interest in the property."" During criminal forfeiture's infancy,
the federal trial courts were given broad discretion to grant or
deny such applications. There were also varying interpretations
of how to handle the constitutionally cogent question of how to
approach situations where pre-conviction criminal forfeiture
restraining orders prevented defendants from hiring private
defense counsel.
The Fourth Circuit opined on this matter by consolidating
three cases in 1987: Harvey, Bassett and Caplin & Drysdale."4 In
affirming the lower court and recognizing the special expertise
that trial courts have on the real-life detriments imposed on criminal suspects denied the power to hire counsel via ex parte forfeiture, the court held that criminal forfeiture was intended to reach
pre-conviction restraints on transfers to pay legitimate attorney's
fees, but also held that this practice violated defendants' constitutional right to counsel of choice.3 " Additionally, the court reasoned
that when the right to counsel of choice is violated, prejudice is
presumed not because public defenders are inherently incompetent, but because choice of counsel has been denied.3 It was also
ruled that pre-conviction forfeiture violated due process where the
defendant is denied a hearing to challenge the propriety of
restraints.
Faced with a similar factual setting, the Eleventh
Circuit held otherwise, valuing the statutory relation back fiction
above the original intent of the rights to counsel and due process.
Valuing the fiction above all else enabled the court to reason that
a defendant does not have a right to use assets that no longer
belong to him, and instead belong to the government, to hire coun32. See, e.g., United States v. Figueroa, 645 F. Supp. 453 (W.D. Pa. 1986) (holding
that attorney was entitled to post-conviction modification of forfeiture order as
provider of good faith services); United States v. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 1308 (D. Md.
1986) (holding that forfeiture of legitimate attorney's fee would violate Sixth
Amendment principles).
33. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(2) (2006).
34. United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987).
35. See id. at 909.
36. See id.
37. Id.
38. See United States v. Bissell, 866 F.2d 1343, 1352-55 (11th Gir. 1989); see also
Bascuas, supra note 11, at 1167-72 (providing further analysis).
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sel.3 9 Adopting one interpretation of the 20th century conception
of the right to counsel (right to appointed counsel for indigents) at
the expense of the original meaning (right to choose counsel for
those with means to do so), the court further reasoned that the
Sixth Amendment sets a minimum right to appointed counsel for
serious crimes"0 and that this protection provided defendants a
modicum of fairness."1 A split in the circuits and the effect of
defendants' fundamental rights varying circuit-to-circuit precipitated the Supreme Court's weighing in on the effect section 853
forfeiture had on defendants' Sixth Amendment rights."
Respondent Peter Monsanto was charged with various drug
and weapon-related RICO and CCE violations. The government
sought and received a section 853 restraining order from the district court on Monsanto's apartment and $35,000 based on reasonable suspicion that they derived from criminal acts.4 " Defendant
challenged the district court order because of his inability to hire
counsel of choice, and the Second Circuit "agree[d] that any such
fees paid to Monsanto's defense counsel [were] exempt from subsequent forfeiture." 4 On appeal, the Supreme Court rejected the
argument of the Second Circuit, bowing to Congress's power to
codify the relation back fiction. The Supreme Court noted there
39. See Bissell, 866 F.2d at 1351; see also In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin &
Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637, 645 (4th Cir. 1988) (utilizing the familiar bank
robber hypothetical); see also United States v. Koblitz, 803 F.2d 1523, 1528 (11th Cir.
1986) (holding that right to counsel in this scenario only extends to counsel defendant
can hire at his own expense); see also Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159
(1988) (holding that right to counsel does not extend to representation of counsel
defendant cannot afford).
40. See Bissell, 866 F.2d at 1351; see also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,
339-40 (1963) (establishing the Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel).
41. See Bissell, 866 F.2d at 1351; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687 (1984) (establishing the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in terms of effective
assistance of counsel and fairness).
42. These opinions were issued on the same day: June 22, 1989. United States v.
Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989); Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491
U.S. 617 (1989). Bruce J. Winick, Professor at the University of Miami School of Law
was present at oral argument and drafted a combined amicus curiae brief on behalf of
the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, ("NACDL"), and the American
Civil Liberties Union, ("ACLU"): see Brief for NACDL, ACLU et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner Caplin & Drysdale and Respondent Monsanto, Caplin &
Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989) (Nos. 87-1729 and 88-454,
respectively), 1988 WL 1026330 [hereinafter NACDL Brief].
43. United States v. Monsanto, 924 F.2d 1186, 1189 (2d Cir. 1989).
44. United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74, 84-85 (2d Cir. 1987) (reversing
district court order that allowed forfeiture of criminal defendant's fees intended to
hire counsel of choice on interlocutory appeal from the Southern District of New
York).
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was no statutory exemption for attorney's fees and equated attorney's fees to "stock-brokers fees, laundry bills, or country club
memberships," which were also not exempt from forfeiture given
their absence from the language of section 853 .41 Admitting that
"[tihis result may seem harsh,""6 Justice White, joined by four
others, held that the district court had authority to enter a pretrial restraining order on the defendant's assets, despite any frustration this precipitated on defendants' right to counsel .4 ' The
Court also held that this practice did not violate defendants' due
process rights and weighing the interests at stake, the Court
stated that "a pretrial restraining order does not arbitrarily interfere with a defendant's fair opportunity to retain counsel."" On
remand, although not required to do so by the Supreme Court's
holding, the Second Circuit held that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments required an adversarial probable cause hearing to restrain
assets defendant intended to use to hire legitimate counsel of
choice.4
The factual scenario in Caplin & Drysdale was not conducive
toward an opinion singing the virtues of the Bill of Rights. First of
all, the petitioner was a law firm seeking payment for representing a client facing CCE charges, not a criminal defendant with
heightened procedural protections; second, the firm was seeking
payment for services rendered after the client had already pled
guilty and was therefore on notice that assets were forfeitable. 50
The circumstances of the case suggest that the Court's holding
may be limited to its particular facts. Justice White, joined by the
same four justices as in Monsanto 5 1 held that section 853, containing a codification of the relation back fiction and providing no
express Sixth Amendment exemption, did not violate defendants'
constitutional right to counsel of choice.5 Secondly, reasoning
that the scope of due process is limited independent of the right to
counsel, the Court chose not to strike down the statute via the
45. Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 609.
46. Id. at 613.
47. See id. at 614.
48. Id. at 616. (internal quotation omitted).
49. See United States v. Monsanto, 924 F.2d 1186, 1203 (2d Cir. 1989).
50. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 619-24 (1989);
see also Bascuas, supra note 11, at 1170.
51. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy.
Interview with Bruce J. Winick, Professor, University of Miami School of Law, in
Coral Gables, Fla. (Jan. 27, 2009) (discussing that this was generally thought to be
the conservative bloc of the late 1980s).
52. See Caplin & Dr-ysdale, 491 U.S. at 619.
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Fifth Amendment."3 The majority did, however, acknowledge that
"[fi orfeiture provisions are powerful weapons in the war on crime;
like any such weapons, their impact can be devastating when used
unjustly," and thus put lower courts on notice that due process
may be violated in certain circumstances.'
As in Monsanto, the Caplin & Drysdale opinion leaned heavily on a trust in the validity of the relation back property fiction.
The Court would have been unable to reason that a "defendant
has no Sixth Amendment right to spend another person's money"~
for legal services without the logical predicate that the defendant,
although not yet convicted, lost the right to transfer his assets
upon the commission of his supposed crime.55 Agreeing with the
Eleventh Circuit's reasoning in Bissell,"6 appointed counsel was
deemed sufficient to satisfy the defendant's Sixth Amendment
rights where forfeiture rendered the defendant a pauper." Siding
with the government, the Court declared that sophisticated private counsel is just another strong weapon the enemy holds in the
war on drugs.5 ' Adoption of such a view by the Court necessarily
ignores the role private counsel hold as guardians of the criminal
adversary process. The codification of the relation back fiction
and the Court's affirmance of its legal validity in Monsanto and
Caplin & Drysdale have not since been called into question by the
Supreme Court and should be understood to be the law of the land
at present date.5 "
If Caplin & Drysdale resulted in an adverse financial impact
on the criminal defense bar, the prosecution of defense attorneys
for money laundering has had a downright frightening one. In
order to understand the issue, it is necessary to point out that section 1957, the "criminally derived property" section, contains an
express exemption that "transaction [is] necessary to preserve a
53. See id. at 633 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-85 (1984))
("[tihe Constitution guarantees a fair trial through the Due Process clause . .. it
defines the basic elements of a fair trial largely through the several provisions of the
Sixth Amendment.").
54. See id. at 634.
55. See id. at 626-28.
56. United States v. Bissell, 866 F.2d 1343, 1351 (11th Cir. 1989).
57. Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 628.
58. Id. at 630.
59. See Fork, supra note 23, at 229 ("The decisions of the Supreme Court in
Monsanto and Caplin & Drysdale have never been seriously questioned or limited by
the Court in the fifteen years since they were handed down."). Note that Fork's
article was written in 2004 and upon independent research conducted in 2009, the
cases have not been overruled and are still good law.
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person's right to representation as guaranteed by the sixth
amendment to the constitution" do not constitute money laundering."0 Attorneys can be convicted of 1957 money laundering if the
prosecution establishes that the attorney knew that fees
originated from unlawful activity and that the attorney knew the
defendant was using him or her to conceal the unlawful activity,
which may be accomplished through the process of representation
itself."' The applicability of the 1957(f) Sixth Amendment exemption is left to the discretion of trial courts, subject to the appeals
process. An allegedly corrupt attorney can also be prosecuted for
"traditional" concealment (section 1956 money laundering), which
can appear in tandem with a 1957 charge.6 "
Miami defense attorney Benedict Kuehne was indicted for,
inter alia, sections 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), knowingly concealing the proceeds of unlawful activity, 1956(a)(2)(B)(i), importing these proceeds from a foreign country, specifically Colombia, as well as
1957, engaging in monetary transactions constituting criminally
derived property." This is the first indictment under the federal
money laundering statutes of an attorney for vetting, or performing due diligence on, another lawyer's legal fees. It is also a key
case for determining the extent to which Monsanto and Caplin &
Drysdale can be used by prosecutors to extend liability to practitioners. Mr. Kuehne is well-respected by his colleagues, and his
ethics and professionalism are regarded as sterling." The indictment shocked much of the legal community and "re-ignited" a war
between the government and the criminal defense bar that once
60. See 18 U.S.C. § 1957(f) (2009); see also Johnson, supra note 29, at 1352-60
(providing further background on § 1957's Sixth Amendment exemption noting that
the original MLCA contained no such provision and that the language is intentionally
vague so as to leave the matter up to the courts).
61. See 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (2009); see also Adam K. Weinstein, Note, Prosecuting
Attorneys for Money Laundering: A New and Questionable Weapon in the War on

Crime, 51

LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBS.

369, 369-75 (Winter 1988).

62. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2009) (containing no language stating that attorneys
cannot be prosecuted); see also, e.g., United States v. Reed, 77 F.3d 139 (6th Cir. 1996)
(prosecuting an attorney under 1956); United States v. Ferguson, 142 F. Supp. 2d
1350, 135 1-52 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (prosecuting an attorney under 1957); United States v.
Velez, No. 1:05-cr-20770-MGC (S.D. Fla. filed May 1, 2008) [hereinafter Kuehne
Indictment] (containing joint 1956 and 1957 charges against an attorney).
63. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (2006); see also Kuehne
Indictment, supra note 62, at 12-16.
64. See, e.g., John Pacenti, Miami Attorney's Indictment May Show the Difficulty
of Identifying 'Clean' Money for Legal Fees, DMiLY Bus.REV., Feb. 8, 2008, available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/articlejsp?id=1202426499766
("CNN legal commentator
Jayne Weintraub. . ...[stated], 'Ben Kuehne has more integrity than any lawyer I
know . . .. [This prosecution is] an indictment on the legal profession.'").
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raged at the time of Monsanto and Caplin & Drysdale twenty
years before."5 According to the indictment, Roy Black, former
defense attorney for drug kingpin Fabio Ochoa,6 paid Mr. Kuehne
nearly $200,000 to vet about $5,000,000 in fees originating from
Colombia before Ochoa was convicted.6 " Mr. Black has avoided
personal charges because his reliance on Mr. Kuehne's opinion letters asserting that the sources of the legal fees were clean prevented federal prosecutors from forming a good faith belief that
Mr. Black "knowingly" handled tainted funds.6 " Specifically, it is
alleged that Mr. Kuehne, along with Gloria Florez Velez and
Oscar Saldarriaga Ochoa (Fabio Ochoa's former accountant and
Colombian attorney, respectively), knowingly falsified documents
and facilitated a series of wire transfers to the United States via
the Black Market Peso Exchange, knowing that the funds were, in
part, the proceeds of drug trafficking." A portion of the funds Mr.
Kuehne attributed to legitimate enterprises apparently derived
from fictitious entities created by American law enforcement."0
Some view the case as an unfounded, biased attack on a wellknown and well-liked lawyer, part of a larger witch hunt against
the criminal defense bar. Prosecutors respond that this is the
blind and even-handed administration of justice at work.7 ' What
is certain is that a man's freedom is on the line, even though he
claims he was just doing his job.
Nearly all federal money laundering cases involving attorneys
65. See id. ("'It's now official: it's a crime to be a criminal defense attorney,' Miami
criminal defense attorney Milton Hirsch said. . . . 'They picked a guy who sleeps with
wing-tipped shoes on and indicted him for going above and beyond to make sure legal
fees paid to a different lawyer are clean . . . .' [Miami attorney and president of the
Miami chapter of the Federal Bar Association David 0. Markus also said:] '[tihe
intent here is to send a message to the criminal defense bar to stay away from these
cases. Unfortunately, this case may reignite the war between criminal defense bar
and the government, a war many of us had thought was long dead."').
66. Kuehne Indictment, supra note 62, at 2 (chronicling that Fabio Ochoa, a leader
of the "Medellin Cartel" was extradited in 2001 to stand trial for conspiring to
smuggle about thirty tons of cocaine per month between 1997 and 1999 and was
convicted in 2003).
67. Kuehne Indictment, supra note 62, at 7-8.
68. See discussion infra Part II.C (discussing prosecutorial practices for money
laundering charges against attorneys and describing the mens rea threshold).
69. Kuehne Indictment, supra note 62, at 3-12.
70. Id.
71. See Julie Kay, Laundering Charges Trouble Attorneys, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 17,
2008, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLd~jsp?id=1205491397525
("[When there is clear evidence of wrongdoing, the Department [of Justice] will honor
its commitment to the pursuit of justice. Attorneys are not immune from prosecution
of money laundering simply on the basis they represent criminal defendants.").
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that resulted in published opinions, most originating in Florida or
Michigan, involve 1956 charges against defense attorneys highly
involved in their client's illegal activities."2 In one salient case setting the standard for burdens of proof, the Southern District of
Florida in Ferguson noted that "liability under § 1957 is much
stricter than liability under § 1956," given the absence of a design
to conceal element." The Ferguson court also held that the
§ 1957(f) Sixth Amendment exemption is an affirmative defense,
not an element of the offense that the government must prove an
absence of beyond a reasonable doubt . 7 ' The court further reasoned that "It~hrough the exception Congress created a safe harbor for legitimate criminal defense expenses; it did not alter the
substantive elements of money laundering under § 1957.~ Fer'
guson was a case of first impression; 1957(f)'s affirmative defense
status has been confirmed by the Eleventh Circuit; and a similar
conception has been adopted in other circuits.
On December 22, 2008, District Judge Cooke granted defendant Kuehne's motion to dismiss the 1957 count, relying on
1957(f)'s Sixth Amendment exemption .7 7 Before praising the revival of the Sixth Amendment, it should be noted that the govern72. See, e.g., United States v. Abbell, 271 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that
evidence of concealment in 1956 prosecution was sufficient where fee payments were
made on behalf of cartel to further its code of silence, and attorneys obtained
affidavits from arrested conspirators stating they did not know cartel leader to whom
payments could be traced and adopting broad "facilitation theory" model of money
laundering); United States v. Reed, 167 F.3d 984 (6th Cir. 1999) (affirming attorney's
conviction where defendant made law office available for drug buyer to drop off money
for seller to pick up from attorney's receptionist); United States v. Ross, 190 F.3d 446
(6th Cir. 1999) (affirming conviction of launderer-attorney where defendant obtained
drugs from client in return for legal services and provided legal advice for clients
regarding the best practices for concealing tainted drug profits); United States v. Elso,
422 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2005) (affirming attorney's money laundering conviction
where attorney drove to client's home to remove $266,800 from hiding spot after client
had a suspicion that law enforcement was pursuing him).
73. See United States v. Ferguson, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1352 n.2 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
74. Id. at 1359. This favors prosecutors because to receive an affirmative defense
instruction, a defendant must present prima facie evidence of its existence, and they
jury must find the affirmative defense to be true by a preponderance of evidence.
Affirmative defenses are easier for prosecutors to refute than having to prove the
absence of a defense beyond a reasonable doubt.
75. Id.
76. See id. at 1351; see e.g., United States v. Hoogenboom, 209 F.3d 665, 669-71
(7th Cir. 2000).
77. See United States v. Velez, No. 1:05-er-20770-MGC (S.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 2008)
[hereinafter Kuehne Order] (order granting defendant Kuehne's motion to dismiss
count one); see also Dan Slater, Judge Dismisses Count I of Ben Kuehne's Money

Laundering Indictment, WALL

STREET JoumRiAL LAw BLOG,

Dec. 22, 2008, available at

http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2008/12/22/Judge-dismisses-count-i-of-ben-kuehnes-money-
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ment has appealed, the Eleventh Circuit's Sixth Amendment is
extremely narrow,"8 and Judge Cooke has been described by some
as exhibiting pro-defendant leanings inconsistent with the more
rigid federal circuit court.7 " Moreover, a chasm in worldview
between the tightly knit Miami legal community and the Eleventh
Circuit should not be underestimated."0 In her written opinion,
Judge Cooke relied heavily on the Ninth Circuit's opinion in the
case of United States v. Rutgard, rather than Eleventh Circuit
precedent.8 " Additionally, it is uncommon for a district court to
grant a defendant the dismissal of a count established to be an
affirmative defense. Notwithstanding the status of the 1957 dismissal, it is likely that Kuehne will stand trial for the 1956
charge. The result of the case likely hinges on mens rea, as
Kuehne will argue that he did not know that the funds were
tainted, since the fact that they were appears conclusive." Nevertheless, Judge Cooke's rejection of the government's common
argument that Caplin & Drysdale has "vitiated" the Sixth Amendlaundering-indicmentl ("Judge Cooke found that Kuehne could not be prosecuted
because the funds were for legitimate legal services.").
78. Compare United States v. Bissell, 866 F.2d 1343, 1350-51 (11th Cir. 1989)
(taking liberties with the Supreme Court's holding in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
355 (1963), reasoning that the Sixth Amendment only sets a minimum guarantee of
appointment of counsel in cases involving serious crimes), with Wheat v. United
States, 486 U.S. 153, 154 (1988) (reasoning that the Sixth Amendment still protects
the right to counsel of choice).
79. See, e.g., United States v. Lorenzo, 471 F.3d 1219 (11th Cir. 2006)
(determining that Judge Cooke's decision to consider a defendant's post-sentence
rehabilitation progress was an improper sentencing factor); United States v. Hassoun,
476 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 2007) (reversing Judge Cooke's order that dismissed a count
of the high profile Padilla-Hassoun-Jayyousi homegrown terrorism case on double
jeopardy grounds); Jay Weaver, Judge in Ben Kuehne Case Calls Charge 'Disturbing',
MiAviL HERALD, Nov. 30, 2008 ("Cooke's bold decision to dismiss the central terrorconspiracy charge in the Padilla case was overturned last year by a federal appeals
court.").
80. See, e.g., Dan Slater, FloridaLegal Community to Ante up for Indicted Lawyer,
WALL ST. J. L. BLOG, Nov. 17, 2008, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2008/11/17/fiorida-legalcommunity-to-ante-up-for-indicted-lawyer/ (publicizing a charity dinner for the
Kuehne legal defense fund where a former Florida Supreme Court Justice, Miami
criminal defense attorneys, a former Florida Bar President, a former Florida Attorney
General and a former U.S. attorney would be in attendance).
81. See Kuehne Order, supra note 77, at 6; see also United States v. Rutgard, 116
F.3d 1270, 1291 (9th Cir. 2007) ("Without the [1957(f) exemption,] a [suspected] drug
dealer's check to his lawyer may have constituted a new federal felony.").
82. See Kay, supra note 71 ("Jose Quinon [Fabio Ochoa's former defense attorney
said that] [for Kuehne to travel to Colombia, where he does not speak the language,
and oversee the sale of cattle was pure folly. 'Ben does not have street smarts . ..
What the hell does Ben know about cows? He's a city slicker. Ben doesn't do drug
cases; he has no idea what the hell he is doing. .. . He didn't know they were phony
documents.'").
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ment exemption breathes new life into the issue and has resurrected a forum for meaningful debate."3 Mr. Kuehne should be
cloaked in the presumption of innocence like all other defendants
accused of crimes until the fact-finding process unravels, but at
this point, there is no convincing evidence that prosecutors have
intentionally singled out, or are attempting to make an example
out of him.
C.

ProsecutorialTactics

To understand the origins of the Kuehne indictment, it is
helpful to analyze sections of the United States Attorneys' Manual, containing the policies and procedures followed by federal
prosecutors, involving forfeiture and money laundering.
Although the manual has no binding force and there is no cause of
action or legal claim for the government's failure to follow its procedures, it strongly guides prosecutorial decisions. The manual
outlines a variety of consultation and notification requirements
between federal prosecutor branches and Washington "[i] n light of
the scope of the money laundering statutes" for the sake of "the
orderly development of the case law and. ...[application of] these
statutes in a consistent manner."" Section 9-105.600, titled "Prosecution Standards-Bona Fide Fees Paid to Attorneys for Representation in a Criminal Matter," contains such a consultation
safeguard and sheds some light on the controversial Kuehne matter.8 The manual directs prosecutors to perform their duties with
the understanding that 1957(f)'s Sixth Amendment exemption is
"extremely limited.""7 Relying on the relation back fiction, this section cites Caplin & Drysdale to remind that "there is no Sixth
Amendment right to use criminally derived property to retain
counsel of choice in a criminal case" and that a conviction or plea
is not necessary in determining which property is and is not "criminally derived." 8 Closely applicable to the Kuehne matter, this
section also states that:
[Tjhe Department, as a matter of policy, will not prosecute
83. See Kuehne Order, supra note 77, at 7.

84. See U.S.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTRomNEYS' MANUAL.

[hereinafter

United States Attorneys' Manual] §§ 9-105.000 to 118.990 (n.d.), available at http:ll
www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/usani/index.html (last visited Oct. 5,
2009).
85. Id. §§ 9-105.310, 9-105.330.
86. Id. § 9-105.600.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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attorneys under § 1957 based upon the receipt of property
constituting bona fide fees for the legitimate representation
in a criminal matter, except if (1) there is proof beyond a
reasonable doubt that the attorney had actual knowledge of
the illegal origin of the specific property received (prosecution is not permitted if the only proof of knowledge is evidence of willful blindness); and such evidence does not
consist of (a) confidential communications made by the client preliminary to and with regard to undertaking representation in the criminal matter; or (b) confidential
communications made during the course of representation
in the criminal matter; or (c) other information obtained by
the attorney during the course of the representationand in
furtherance of the obligation to effectively represent the
client."9

Taken at face value, this language appears fair and reasonable.
However, the definition of "bona fide fees" excludes fees subject to
forfeiture under the relation back fiction. Even if a defense attorney has a subjective belief in the innocence of his or her client or
thinks that the government should bear the burden of persuasion,
fees can still be not "bona fide" and are therefore subject to forfeiture. Moreover, the scope of what information can be gained from
the client by a defense attorney during the course of representation without exposure to a money laundering charge and the
extent of attorney-client privilege is ill-defined and open to varying interpretation, particularly with relation back in effect.
In regards to pre-indictment, pre-conviction criminal forfeiture, section 9-111.130 mandates that "the United States Attorney
will ensure proper and timely pre-indictment coordination with
the United States Marshals Service to prepare for and assess the
property management and financial needs of those assets subject
to criminal forfeiture."90 Section 9-111.600 requires that "[sleized
cash [including assets with which a defendant intends to retain
counsel], except where it is to be used as evidence" is to be deposited promptly in the Seized Asset Deposit Fund ("SADF") pending
forfeiture.""2 Governmental use of funds in the SADF is intended
to "prevent crime, enforce Federal laws and represent the rights
and interests of the American people."" The amount of assets
89.
90.
91.
92.

See id. (emphasis added).
United States Attorneys' Manual, supra note 84,
Id. § 111.600; see discussion infra Part III.C.
United States Attorneys' Manual, supra note 84,

93. See U.S.

§ 9-111.130.
§ 9-111.600.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ASSET FORFEITURE FUND,
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seized per year has increased recently, as "there has been significant growth in the value of deposits . .. fueled by several large
fraud and economic crime forfeiture cases," and approximately
$1,500,000 was forfeited to the government in 2007 alone. 4 The
government converts funds from criminal activity, including preconviction alleged criminal activity, for use to fund the continuance of the forfeiture mechanism, implement new crime fighting
programs and distribute locally through the equitable sharing
program."5
Section 9-119.200 cautions prosecutors to tread lightly when
applying forfeiture provisions to attorney's fees. 96 The manual
recognizes that the requirement that an attorney bears the burden of proving lack of reasonable cause to believe fees were subject
to forfeiture may "hamper" defense attorneys from ably representing their clients, calling for a thoughtful exercise of prosecutorial
discretion in this situation." Section 9-119.203 elaborates on limiting the forfeiture mechanism on fees, specifying that such fees
may be exempt from forfeiture where "(1) there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the particular asset is not subject to forfeiture; and (2) the asset is transferred in payment of legitimate fees
for legal services actually rendered or to be rendered."" Again,
the definition of "subject to forfeiture" is rather broad. Guideline
2307, titled "Forfeiture of Assets Transferred to an Attorney for
Representation in a Criminal Matter," directs prosecutors to seek
forfeiture where "there are reasonable grounds to believe that the
attorney had actual knowledge that the asset was subject to forfeiture at the time of the transfer." 9 Despite the subjective federal
mens rea requirement regarding "knowledge," 100 a higher require(nd.), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/2009justification/pdffyO9-aff.
pdf.
94. See id. at 4, 9.
95. See generally id.; see also John Shanks & Kevin Morison, Sheriffs Can Use
Asset Forfeiture Funds to Support the National Law Enforcement Museum, SHERIFF
MAGAziNE, Fall 2008, at 72, available at http://www.sheriffs.org/file.asp?F=8D99
B6C9D1CE46B8B9ED0185D5D47579.pdf&N=SHO8_6_Shanks Morison.pdf&C=spot
lights/documents ("[Wihy not allow sheriffs offices and other law enforcement
agencies to use some of their federal asset forfeiture funds [through equitable
sharing] to build the first-ever national museum dedicated to law enforcement?").
96. See United States Attorneys' Manual, supra note 84, § 119.200.
97. See id.
98. See id. § 9-119.203.
BUDGET 2

99. U.S.
RESOURCE

DEP'T

MANLI.§

OF JUSTICE,

UNITED

STATES

AfTRroNEYs'

MANUAL:

CRIMINAL.

2307 (n.d.) [hereinafter CriminalResource Manual], availableat

http://www.usdoj .gov/usao/eousa/foia-.reading-room/usam/title9/crm02300.htm.
100. Compare, e.g., United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1976) (specifying
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ment than the similarly subjective "reasonable cause to believe,"
prosecutors may unilaterally impose "knowledge" that assets are
"forfeitable" on a defense attorney by issuing an indictment
against the defense attorney's client seeking forfeiture.' 0' This circular provision suggests that all assets listed as such in an indictment are forfeitable (same as "subject to forfeiture"), which is
logically tantamount to saying that all women on the planet Earth
are datable as long as I say they are. This circumvents instances
where a defense attorney holds a genuine subjective belief that his
client will beat the charges and that ultimately assets will not be
forfeitable through sleight of hand. This is contrary to Professor
Winick's opinion that Congress intended that the phrase "reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture" would connote "bounded by reason" and that extension of
this to defense attorneys in instances of legitimate attorney's fees
is out of bounds. 0 The United States Attorneys' Manual on forfeiture and money laundering could be improved 0 3 if the Department of Justice is sincerely interested in restoring defendants'
constitutional rights and working within the parameters of the
law;' 4 however, the manual does put defense attorneys on notice
of current prosecutorial practices and procedures, contrary to complaints of lack of notice by the defense bar. 0 5
Whatever the government's true goals are regarding the
power to choose whether they face private or court-appointed
counsel to represent a defendant, prosecutors do hold the power to
render a defendant a pauper via forfeiture and may dissuade private attorneys from taking cases for fear of a money laundering
indictment. 06 In United States v. Cronic, the Court stated that
"an indispensable element of the effective performance of [the
defense bar's] responsibilities is the ability to act independently of
the Government and oppose it in adversary litigation. "' Federal
that knowledge means a state of mind of one who acts with an awareness of the high
probability of the fact in question, such as one who does not possess positive
knowledge only because he consciously avoids it), with MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(b)
(2001).
101. Criminal Resource Manual, supra note 99, § 2313.
102. See Winick, supra note 14, at 845.
103. See discussion infra Part V.B.
104. See discussion infra Part III.B.
105. See, e.g., Diana Digges, How Clean is Your Client's Money?, LAwYER'S WEEK<LY
USA, Feb. 2004, available at http://www.lexisone.com/balancinglarticleslw020004a.
html ("Lawyers are thirsting for guidelines to make sure they don't cross the line.").
106. See Winick, supra note 14, at 776-85; see also Kay, supra note 71.
107. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 n.17 (1984).
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public defenders work vigorously in representing their clients, but
an appointed attorney gives a newly "indigent" defendant the
sense that he is surrounded by government on both sides. Defending RICO and other complex conspiracy cases with multiple
charges and defendants is time-consuming, labor-intensive and
necessarily expensive. Certain federal public defender's offices
are adequately staffed and may liberally apply to receive further
funding.'
Federal public defenders are often skilled, energetic
and hard-working, but the Supreme Court has noted that there is
no substitute for experienced private defense counsel, particularly
in trial work.' 9
Yet another grave problem is that federal pre-conviction forfeiture has enabled parallel state laws."10 Florida and similarly
situated states simply cannot adequately fund their public
defender's offices, causing them to turn back clients."' This
researcher saw this phenomenon firsthand during the summer of
2008: the Miami public defender's office, with a 400-felony-a-year
caseload, was forced to deny clients representation while pleading
to Tallahassee for more aid."' Notwithstanding arguments that
forfeiture has a chilling effect on defendants' Sixth Amendment
rights to counsel of choice, many state public defender's offices
simply cannot shoulder the heavy burden that forfeiture has
placed on them.
III.

A.

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

Proper Constitutional Interpretation

The United States Constitution is "[o~rdained in the name of
108. Interview with Ricardo J. Bascuas, Professor, University of Miami School of
Law, in Coral Gables, Fla. (Dec. 9, 2008).
109. See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 647 n.12
(1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (pointing out that even in the federal system, with
"generous" compensation plans under the Criminal Justice Act, the majority of
federal public defenders lack practical experience).
110. See United States Attorneys' Manual § 9-111.120 (mentioning that federal
forfeiture is "intended to encourage state and local law enforcement agencies to use
state forfeiture laws").
111. Institute of Justice, Policingand Prosecutingfor Profit: New Jersey Ex-Sheriff
Fights Civil Forfeiture Abuse, http://ij.org/index.php?option=com-content&task=view
&id=1008&ltemid=165 (last visited Oct. 5, 2009) (outlining forfeiture's profound
effects on the New Jersey justice system).
112. See Maureen Dimino, Confronting a Constitutional Crisis: Miami-Dade Chief

Public Defender Stands His Ground, CHAMPION

MAGAZINE,

Oct. 2008, at 24, available

at http://www.criminaljustice.org/public.nsf/01cle7698280d20385256d~b00789923/lb
4d39774ce68e73852575270064b09f?openflocument (chronicling summer 2008 events
and current budget challenges in Florida).
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the American people, repeatedly amended by them and for them,
the document also addresses itself to them.""' The Constitution is
not only law, it is the supreme law of the land, sitting atop even
federal statutes enacted by representatives chosen by a majority
of the American people."' Like any other law, it is not static, may
be amended and "its meaning, like that of all other law, is the
meaning the lawmakers were understood to have intended." 1 5
Since the time of Chief Justice John Marshall's decision in Marbury," it has been the province of the Court to exercise judicial
review and strike down legislation that violates the original
meaning of the Constitution. The original intent interpretation is
the best among the alternatives if judges are to strive for objectivity in the blind administration of justice; indeed, "[tihe Court can
act as a legal rather than a political institution only if it is neutral
...
in the way it derives and defines the principles it applies."'
The legislature operates and serves the American people through
majority rule, but "[t~he only thing majorities may not do is invade
the liberties the Constitution specifies.""' The most important
function of the Constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights, is to
serve as a check on majority abuses against the minority. A judge
"6must apply [the Constitution] consistently and without regard to
his sympathy or lack of sympathy with the parties before him,"
even if the judge perceives the party before it as a reprehensible
drug smuggler or ethically questionable law firm."19 The pursuit
of objectivity and neutrality in principal is crucial if the law is to
have any true legitimacy and if the federal courts are to be a neutral and non-political branch, as the framers intended.
Original intent critics commonly argue that the framers did
not envision modern constructs, such as the growth of a massive
international drug trade, which would debilitate the health, safety
and economic condition of the nation, so our interpretation of the
document must change with the times. However, social exigency
113. AKHIL REED AmAR, AMERICA's CONSTITrUTION: A BIOGRAPHY, at xi (Random
House, 2005).
114. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, ci. 2.

115. See ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
145 (Free Press, 1990).
116. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
117. See Bork, supra note 115, at 146.
118. See id. at 147.
119. See id. at 151; interview with Bruce J. Winick, Professor, University of Miami
School of Law, in Coral Gables, Fin. (Jan. 17, 2009) (commenting that the Caplin &
Drysdale and Monsanto holdings were heavily influenced by the social context of the
late 1980s and "war on drugs" fervor).
THE L~w
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does not enable the chief interpreters sitting on the United States
Supreme Court to arrive at socially satisfying political conclusions
on the premise that social policy and legal fictions trump our core
values of due process and the right to counsel. To say that the
Constitution constantly changes as the values surrounding it do is
simplistic, non-objective and cheapens stare decisis. If the Constitution rewrites itself as we do, there would be over 300,000,000
Constitutions; if it progresses as our social norms do, then justices
are given the power to define what is progress and what is regress,
yet policy is clearly in the legislature's domain. Critics argue that
original intent interpretation is often too strictly textual, narrow
and inert, but this is not the case. Textual and original intent
interpretations are distinct; for example, the "right to privacy" is
not textually apparent in the document, yet it screams from every
inch of negative space therein. Similarly, the framers did not
envision the use of thermovision technology by law enforcement to
look inside homes and apprehend citizens engaged in illegal activity, yet the Court in Kyllo correctly inferred that the framers
would not have allowed such a gross invasion into the home without a warrant.'
Lastly, the Constitution and the Court's duty is
strongest where core rights are infringed 1 2' rather than when
rights are expanded, 2 2 if the highest body of law is to be understood, as it was and should be, primarily as a safeguard for the
trampled-on few.
There is a right and wrong way to interpret the Constitution.
It is difficult to excuse Supreme Court decisions that have
resulted in twenty years of unconstitutional violations against the
minority. Future courts should not feel confined to obey the dictates of these cases. Stare decisis is important for consistency and
the development of doctrine, but it cannot be "an ironclad rule""2 '
unless one operates under the assumption that justices are always
faithful to the Constitution: "[ilt is . .. not only [the Court's] prerogative but also [its] duty to re-examine a precedent where its
reasoning or understanding of the Constitution is fairly called into
120. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
121. Contra id., with Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617
(1989), and United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989).
122. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (expanding original intent notions
of federal power, the Court declares that states must follow the one person on vote
system for state popular equality in state elections); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(expanding original intent notions of federal power via the right to privacy, the Court
declares that women have a right to choose whether or not to have an abortion).
123. See Bork, supra note 115, at 155.
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question. 2 What is unfortunate is the possibility that the justices who held that the relation back fiction trumps the Bill of
Rights decided the case without neutrality of the mind before
carefully considering precedent and the true (and truly absent)
origins of the relation back fiction."2 ' When reading these cases, it
becomes apparent that the Supreme Court is complicit with Congress and that the federal government is complicit with the states.
Therefore, the Court's duty to protect the minority becomes even
more critical. The Caplin & Drysdale and Monsanto majority bloc
was obsessed with the war on drugs, clouding their application of
America's most important legal document. 126 Instead of allowing
temporary restraining orders on a pre-convicted party's assets
even where a defendant intends to hire a defense lawyer, there
should be a permanent restraining order between politics and law.
The majority either adopted the belief that the Court is a
"naked power organ" 27 (knowing a priori what is best for society)
or overestimated public apathy when stating in Caplin & Drysdale that the codification of the relation back fiction within section
853(c) "reflects the application of the long-recognized and lawful
practice of vesting title to any forfeitable assets, in the United
States, at the time of the criminal act ... 11"2 The lack of legal
citation in this portion has less to do with trifling clerks and
instead reflects the lack of legal foundation for extending the relation back fiction, and with it the concepts of in rem forfeiture, to
the criminal arena. Justice White does rely on Stowell, a 1890
case in which a distillery was forfeited to the government in violation of the Internal Revenue Code. However, the forfeiture at
issue in Stowell was not open to the same constitutional scrutiny
as it related solely to taxes and property interests; the Sto well
defendant did not, and could not, seek to invalidate the forfeiture
statute at issue under an assertion of personal Bill of Rights violations since his liberty was not at stake.' Moreover, the govern124. See id. at 156 (quoting Justice Powell).
125. Interview with Bruce J. Winick, Professor, University of Miami School of Law,
in Coral Gables, Fla. (Jan. 17, 2009) (in which Professor Winick commented that the
Caplin & Drysdale and Monsanto justices were heavily influenced by the social
context of the late 1980s and "war on drugs" fervor). It should be noted, if not already
apparent, that Professor Winick participated in these cases and in oral argument.
126. Id.
127. See Bork, supra note 115, at 149.
128. Gaplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 627 (1989)
(emphasis added).
129. See generally United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1 (1890), cited in Caplin &
Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 627.
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ment in Stowell had a solid possessory interest in the defendant's
assets since tax payments were necessary for the defendant to
comply with federal tax law. White's use of Stowell is an unjustified extension of the scant forfeiture precedent, not a reliance on
long-established precedent. Without Stowell, the only leg White
has to stand on is "a strong governmental interest" 30 -rhetoric
which cannot seriously be regarded as solid constitutional analysis weighed against severe governmental intrusions.
If the relation back fiction is indeed "long-recognized," it is
peculiar that Supreme Court justices could have been confused as
to its true mechanics in a 1993 in rem forfeiture case, 92 Buena
Vista.13' The case involved the civil forfeiture of real estate that
was allegedly bought with drug proceeds and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to clarify forfeiture mechanics and property
ownership. 13 ' The 92 Buena Vista plurality could not reach a consensus on when exactly title in the forfeitable property vests in
the government. 113 The concept is also not well-established, as
courts in the past century have aimed to limit the unfair effects of
the relation back theory, even in the purely civil in rem area, notwithstanding its extension in the criminal law where there are
more procedural protections for defendants. 34 Other commentators have searched for instances of the utilization of relation back
doctrine in criminally related cases, but to no avail; it is "an innovation virtually without precedent in American law." 3
If relation back has no foundation in American law, perhaps it
has some basis in British law, which heavily influenced the framers' minds. However, an investigation of British law produces no
such result; the criminal relation back fiction is purely an American innovation, established circa 1984."3' Decisions out of Great
Britain indicate that criminals have, and have always had, at
130. See Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 631.
131. See United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 507 U.S. 111 (1993).
132. See id.
133. Compare id. at 129 (Stevens, J., leading plurality) (ruling that the government
is not the owner of property before forfeiture is decreed), with id. at 134 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (stating that the relation back doctrine constitutes a retroactive vesting of
title in the government).
134. See United States v. One 1936 Ford Coach, 307 U.S. 219 (1939); see also Fork,
supra note 24, at 211-15 (collecting cases and arguing that until the 1970 RICO and
CCE laws, the Supreme Court aimed to limit the application of relation back theory in
in rem forfeiture, particularly in relation to third parties).
135. See Fried, supra note 20, at 335.
136. See Money Laundering Control Act, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1352(a), 100 Stat.
3207-21 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957 (2009).
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least a partial possessory interest in the proceeds of their alleged
crimes in our mother country. 137 The American relation back's feature that ill-gotten gains "vest" in the government at the instant a
crime is committed, by definition, means that there is no other
party with any property interest besides the government. 13 8 In
Webb v. Chief Constable, the Royal Court of Justice held that
money seized on suspicion of it being the proceeds of drug trafficking must be returned to the individual from which it was seized
when the purpose for which it was seized no longer applies. 3 '
Although the police argued that they were holding the proceeds
until the true owner was identified, the court reasoned that the
alleged drug dealer was entitled to recoup his losses "if, he could
establish his title without relying on his own illegality, even if it
emerged that the title on which he relied was acquired in the
course of carrying through an illegal transaction.""' This ruling
was made despite the police's strong possessory and policy-based
interests, in stark contrast to the majority's reasoning in Caplin &
Drysdale. In Attorney General v. Blake, a case involving an
author's right to the proceeds of a biography chronicling "a selfconfessed traitor's" time spent as a secret Soviet agent operating
within Britain, the House of Lords relied on centuries-old common
law property concepts and refused to apply the 1911 Official
Secrets Act. That Act states that "the Attorney General is entitled
to intervene by instituting civil proceedings, in aid of the criminal
law, to uphold the public policy of ensuring that a criminal does
not retain profit directly derived from the commission of his
crime."' 1 In Blake, the House of Lords admonished a "dearth of
judicial decision" on the books on the matter of property vesting in
the Crown at the time an offense is committed, even in a serious
circumstance such as treason. 14 2 In the United States, the framers
137. E-mail Interview with Anthony Price, Counsel for Intervener British
Columbia Civil Liberties Association on behalf of Robin Chatterjee (Jan. 5, 2009,
15:12 EST) [hereinafter Price E-mail] (on file with author) ("The government in
Chatterjee relied on the 'relation back' theory, but we countered that with some useful
decisions from England . . .. providting] a strong basis to argue that at common law
criminals have at least a possessory interest in the proceeds of their crime.").
138. See BLACK'S LAW DICTioNARY 758 (3 pocket ed. 2006) ("[VIest, vb.: 1. To confer
ownership of (property) upon a person. 2. To invest (a person) with the full title to
property. 3. To give (a person) an immediate, fixed right of present or future
enjoyment. . . . vested, adj. Having become a completed, consummated right for
present or future enjoyment; not contingent; unconditional; absolute.")
139. See Webb v. Chief Constable, [20001 1 All E.R. 209 (Eng.).
140. Id. at 113.
141. AG v. Blake, [2001] 1 A.C. 268 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Ch.) (Eng.).
142. See id.
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demonstrated a clear intention to break from the British common
law tradition of forfeiture upon conviction for treason."' 3 The logic
of extending the practice to less serious crimes has not yet been
seriously considered given the strong social policy interest of disabling the drug trade's financial base.
Without any reliable legal or historical support, the relation
back fiction and § 853 forfeiture, also codified within the federal
money laundering statutes, must fail. As a society committed to
constitutional principles, we should be "deeply concerned about
the prosecution's trailblazing use of forfeiture to cripple the
accused before the trial has even started." 44 As Justice Blackmun
pointed out in the Caplin & Drysdale dissent, "[t~he notion that
the Government has a legitimate interest in depriving
criminals-before they are convicted-of economic power ... is more
than just somewhat unsettling . . .. [it] is constitutionally sus-

pect."'145 Since the relation back fiction is a fictitious toothpick
supporting undue governmental power over the minority, ipso
facto, we must proceed without recognition of it.
B. Fifth Amendment Due Process
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
requires that "[nlo person shall . .. be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation."'
Modern federal forfeiture and money laundering law violates due process on
five grounds: nullifying the presumption of innocence, failing to
require that prosecutors prove every element beyond a reasonable
doubt given a judicial misunderstanding of subjective mens rea,
failing to provide adequate hearings to defendants, unjustly tilting the overall adversarial balance of fairness in favor of the government, and inserting civil in rem concepts like the relation back
fiction into the criminal law.
Our criminal justice system is based on the all-important presumption of innocence, but the old adage that it is better to let ten
guilty people go free than to convict one innocent has been forgotten. In Winship, the Court clarified criminal defendants' constitu143. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, ci. 2 ("The Congress shall have power to declare
the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of
Blood, or Forfeiture . .. .)
144. NACDL Brief, supra note 42, at 9-10.
145. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 640 n.7 (1989)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (internal quotation omitted).
146. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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tional procedural due process rights. In it, the Court ruled that
laying within the very foundation of criminal law and due process
was the presumption of innocence as well as the requirement that
the prosecution bear the burden of proving every element of a
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 147 Pre-conviction forfeiture, by
distorting civil law concepts and misplacing them within the criminal law, assumes that the defendant is presumed guilty before
being assessed by a jury of his peers. What right does a bank robber have to use stolen money to hire a lawyer?"4 " None, but before
the robber is convicted, he is a suspected bank robber, and the
money is only allegedly stolen. Winship and hundreds of years of
the development of our law requires us to think this way. Further, the bank robber is "dissipating the actual property of others,
whereas the suspected drug dealer who spends profits from allegedly illegal drug activity is not interfering with the property interests of other persons" and therefore has superior claim of title."4 '
Lastly, the bank robber often steals bills specially marked by the
bank, or has been caught red-handed outside of the bank, giving
law enforcement probable cause to lawfully seize the assets as evidence with a Fourth Amendment seizure.
Shifting focus to attorneys, Justice White relied on Laska to
argue that "[n] o lawyer, in any case..., has the right to ... accept
stolen property, or . .. ransom money, in payment of a fee ..

The privilege to practice law is not a license to steal .

150

This is

true, but only after a judicial declaration that the money was stolen, via a plea bargain or conviction. The "privilege to practice
law" involves a duty to fight vigorously on behalf of a client that is
presumed innocent. The relation back fiction gave the Caplin &
Drysdale and Monsanto majorities license to utilize a broader
scope of cases that never violated the presumption of innocence as
grossly as pre-conviction forfeiture of a criminal defendant's
assets did.
Prosecutors must, and courts must see to it that they do,
prove that the defendant's conduct has met every element of the
147. See generally In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
148. See, e.g., In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837
F.2d 637, 645 (4th Gir. 1988) (utilizing the familiar bank robber hypothetical).
149. See Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 653 & n.15 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
("The Government's interest in the assets at the time of their restraint is no more
than an interest in safeguarding fictive property rights ... . We do not deal with
contrabnd.... [nor] instrumentalities of crime."); see also Johnson, supra note 29, at
1331.
150. Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 626 (quoting Laska v. United States, 82 F.2d
672, 677 (10th Cir. 1936)).
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crime beyond a reasonable doubt before conviction;"' 1 judges may
issue directed verdicts in favor of the defense if they do not. In
order for the government to bring a money laundering charge
against an attorney for accepting tainted fees from a client, prosecutors must hold reasonable belief that the attorney had subjective actual knowledge of the fees' taint. 1 2 With the foresight that
absurdity may ensue given the breadth of liability that federal
money laundering permits, the NACDL successfully lobbied Congress to insert the "knowing" mens rea for money laundering.
Unfortunately, the courts have strayed from a proper application
of the "knowing" mens rea. 5 1 The federal courts, and the United
States Attorneys' Manual, claim to have adopted the definition of
"knowing" as specified in the Model Penal Code 15 4 and the Ninth
Circuit case Jewell.' Judicial misunderstanding of "knowing,"
particularly in 1957 money laundering prosecutions, can result in
a miscarriage of justice, and such a miscarriage was present in
Campbell, a case out of the Fourth Circuit. 5 1 In Campbell, a real
estate agent was tried and convicted for money laundering after
selling a home to a man who may have appeared to be a drug
dealer: he drove a Porsche, flashed large wads of cash, used a cellular phone and drank beer during normal business hours in front
of the agent. 15 ' The trial court rightly set aside the verdict, rea151. See Winship, 397 U.S. at 358.
152. See Criminal Resource Manual, supra note 99, § 2307.
153. See S. REP. No. 433, at 11-12 (1986); see also Johnson, supra note 29, at 1314
n.87 (1993) ("Congress' rejection of 'reason to know' and 'reckless disregard' standards
[for 19571 came in response to testimony by representatives of the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the American Civil Liberties Union, and
other groups that vigorously opposed use of these standards as a substitute for actual
knowledge.").
154. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(b) (1985) ("A person acts knowingly with respect to
a material element of the offense when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his
conduct or the attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature
or that such circumstances exist; and (ii) if the element involves a result of his
conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a
result.") (emphasis added).
155. See United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697,703-04 (9th Cir. 1976) (ruling that
the term knowingly is not limited to positive knowledge, but includes a subjective
awareness of a high probability of the fact in question, such as one who does not
possess positive knowledge, only because he consciously avoids it and that actual
belief that the fact in question does not exist does not constitute knowing that the fact
exists).
156. See United States v. Campbell, 977 F.2d 854 (4th Cir 1992); see generally
Johnson, supra note 29, at 1305-11 (arguing that misunderstanding of "knowingly" in
the context of money laundering prosecutions has often encroached on Bill of Rights
protections).
157. See Campbell, 977 F.2d at 854.
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soning that the agent did not have actual knowledge, a subjective
awareness of a high probability that her client was a drug dealer
and was not consciously avoiding such knowledge. 1 18 The Fourth
Circuit reversed, relying on a post factum assessment of what was
in the real estate agent's head despite a lack of evidence to support a legal conviction."5 ' Given the failure of the government to
prove that the client expressly bragged about his exploits, it would
have been just as reasonable for the real estate agent to think that
the client was a party boy with a rich dad; a subjective awareness
of the high probability of the fact in question, the client's illegal
propensities and ill-gotten assets, was not satisfied. The court
improperly applied its own prejudices instead of carefully examining the scant evidence of the real estate agent's knowledge at the
time the offense occurred."' Should a similar broken analytical
mode be employed in the Kuehne matter, or in any subsequent
money laundering prosecutions of those whose job title requires
contact with tainted funds (i.e. bankers, real estate agents and
lawyers), due process will be violated. Lastly, it is worth recalling
that, according to the United States Attorneys' Manual, prosecutors have the power to impose subjective knowledge of a client's
tainted assets by issuing an indictment against the client; such an
assumption also violates due process, particularly when the lawyer has a subjective actual belief that his client will beat the
charges." 6 '
Defendants facing ex parte pre-conviction criminal forfeiture
are commonly not afforded a forum to challenge the forfeiture.
This practice violates due process, particularly after we dispose of
the relation back fiction. 6 ' In the seminal due process for adversarial hearings case, Matthews v. Eldridge, the Court ruled that
due process for hearings is not technical, but is instead a flexible
determination that relies on various factors. 6 The court must bal158. See United States v. Campbell, 777 F. Supp. 1259, 1266 (W.D. N.C. 1991)
(reasoning that appearance alone does not satisfy knowledge that a real estate client
is necessarily a drug dealer at the trial court level).
159. See Campbell, 977 F.2d at 860.
160. See id. at 858-60 (conceding that the evidence of the real estate agent's
knowledge of the client's illegal activities was "not overwhelming," yet reasoning that
the agent objectively should have known, and thus misapplying the federal knowledge
standard).
161. See supra Part HIC.
162. See generally Bascuas, supra note 11, at 1163 (arguing that the presumption of
innocence and procedural due process requires that a defendant be afforded the
opportunity to challenge the pre-conviction forfeiture of assets, particularly when
such forfeiture results in a collateral deprivation of Bill of Rights guarantees).
163. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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ance the private interest affected by the restraint, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, the probable value of additional or substitute safeguards,
and the government's police interest.164 Before the Supreme Court
weighed in on the topic of pre-conviction restraint hearings, the
Eleventh Circuit held in Bissell that a narcotics defendant had no
due process right to an adversarial hearing prior to an ex parte
order freezing assets derived from narcotics offenses."' 5 This holding rested on an assumption that the assets derived from narcotics
offenses even before the defendant was convicted of the crime. To
no avail, appellants in Bissell argued that "when pretrial
restraints are imposed on assets, the Fifth Amendment requires a
hearing on the merits at which the government must prove the
probability that the defendant will be convicted and that his

assets will be forfeited. 1116 Such an argument is entirely reasonable and consistent with the Eldridge factors, yet the appellate
court felt that defendant did not deserve a "full-blown hearing ...
in light of the government's compelling regulatory interest in
preventing crime.""6 Whlile the government does have a strong
regulatory interest, the Eleventh Circuit did not put much weight
on defendant's right to a "full blown hearing" during a meaningful
interaction with the government with property, and by extension,
liberty at stake. As to the erroneous deprivation prong, the Bissell
court conceded that "[t]he clear danger posed by this statutory
scheme [of pre-conviction forfeiture of assets connected to fundamental Bill of Rights protections] is the possibility that perfectly
legitimate assets will be wrongfully restrained.""6 ' By depending
on the relation back fiction, the court did not have to fully apply
Eldridge from the viewpoint of the defendant since "when two parties [the presumptively innocent defendant and the government]
have property rights in contested assets, a due process analysis

must comprehend both interests.' 6 6' The next year, when the
Supreme Court decided Monsanto and Caplin & Drysdale, the
Court offered little procedural guidance to lower federal courts,
thereby endorsing draconian procedures such as those outlined by
164. See id. at 335.
165. See United States v. Bissel, 866 F.2d 1343, 1352-54 (11th Cir. 1989).
166. Id. at 1352.
167. Id. at 1353; contra Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335.
168. Bissell, 866 F.2d. at 1354.
169. See id. Interestingly enough, the Eleventh Circuit relied on a civil
sequestration statute in order to pull this rabbit out of a hat. See also generally
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
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the Eleventh Circuit in Bissell.' However, on remand, the Second Circuit reasoned that due process required that the defendant
Monsanto be afforded an adversarial hearing to challenge forfeiture. 171 Discounting the circular logic of the United States Attorneys' Manual, according to federal law, an indictment cannot, on
its face, conclusively establish probable cause that the listed
assets were forfeitable. 7 Other circuits have properly connected
the dots, coming to the correct conclusion that "a property owner's
interest is particularly great when he or she needs the restrained
assets to pay for legal defense on associated criminal charges
. . ".73 There would be nothing extraordinary about allowing
defense counsel to appear at forfeiture hearings; the police interest would not be injured, and in fact, public confidence in law
enforcement and the criminal process would be improved through
the administration of fair hearings.
Although the following has not gained vast support because of
judicial deference to governmental policy interests, it is worth setting forth the argument that federal forfeiture and money laundering laws have unfairly tipped the tenuous adversarial balance
in favor of the government, violating due process. Prosecutors are
given considerable leeway in attaching a criminal forfeiture
charge to various federal charges, influencing plea negotiations
and impinging on the authority to determine who defense counsel
will be, public or private."7 ' Even the Bissell court recognized that
section 853 forfeiture permitted prosecutorial abuses by "seek Iing]
broad, sweeping restraints recklessly or intentionally encompassing legitimate, nonindictable assets."'
Prosecutors are, and
should be, vested with discretion and be presumed to act in good
faith to issue indictments with the public's best interest in mind,
but with broadly worded federal statutes at their disposal, the
opportunity for abuse is heightened. 1 76
170. See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989);
United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989).
171. United States v. Monsanto, 924 F.2d 1186, 1193-94 (2d Cir. 1991); see also
Bascuas, supra note 11, at 1172-73.
172. See Monsanto, 924 F.2d at 1196.
173. United States v. Holy Land Found., 493 F.3d 469, 475 (5th Cir. 2007).
174. See Fork, supra note 23, at 232 (developing a similar argument regarding
upsetting the adversarial balance).
175. See United States v. Bissel, 866 F.2d 1343, 1355 (11th Cir. 1989).
176. See Morvillo, supra note 15, at 138 ("Prosecutors have had the power to
engineer this shift in priorities [towards money laundering prosecutions] because
they enjoy virtually unfettered discretion in fashioning and filing accusations.
[C] ourts have largely acquiesced in the government's charging practices and virtually
ignored the prosecutors' increased and sometimes abusive use of the grand jury.").
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The Caplin & Drysdale majority acknowledged petitioner's
argument that section 853 forfeiture will have the effect of upsetting the "balance of forces between the accused and his accuser. "117
Reasoning that a power imbalance is not enough to render a federal statute unconstitutional (even when the statute is based on a
dead property fiction), Justice White adopted a narrow view of
procedural due process, stating that the right to a fair trial did not
7
extend very far beyond the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 1
In actuality, procedural due process does extend far beyond the
right to counsel. Due process provides courts a tool to analyze the
general fairness of statutes; it also requires notification of
charges, an opportunity for a hearing, well-articulated and nonvague charges, charges that are credibly based, the presumption
of innocence and requirement that the government prove every
element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. These and other
basic criminal procedural guarantees have little or no relation to
the Sixth Amendment.
Criminal defendants' access to due process may be inhibited
by conflicts of interest faced by defense attorneys given RICO and
the MLCA's breadth, exacerbated through money laundering
prosecutions of attorneys . 79 Defense attorneys are ethically obligated to vigorously represent clients, necessitating research into a
client's background to be sure that no material stone is left
unturned in preparing a defense. 180 Information gathered by
defense attorneys through client interviews and possibly incriminating evidence gathered through independent investigation are
private and protected by attorney-client privilege and the right to
counsel.'18' However, this sacred privilege is abrogated by the
"crime-fraud" exception to the attorney-client privilege, which
177. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 633 (1989)
(White, J., majority) (quoting Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 (1973)).
178. See id. at 633-34 (White, J., majority) ("We are not sure that this [upset in the
balance of power] contention adds anything to petitioner's Sixth Amendment claim,
because, while I'[t~he Constitution guarantees a fair trial through the Due Process
Clauses . . . it defines the basic elements of fair trial largely through the several
provisions of the Sixth Amendment."') (quoting Strickland v. Washington 466 U.S.
668, 684-85 (1984)).
179. See Abramovsky, supra note 7, at 686.
180. See Digges, supra note 105 ("[Defense attorney Irwin Schwartz remarked:]
[t~he code of professional responsibility requires that I represent my clients zealously.
When a client comes in for representation, whether that's someone on a marijuana
charge or a senior corporate executive, the lawyer's first job is to build trust and
confidence. If you begin by cross-examining the client, it undercuts the attorneyclient relationship.").
181. See United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1224 (2d Cir. 1997) ("[Tlhe essence
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does not protect communications and information deemed to further misconduct."' 2 Since the MLCA criminalizes fees for legal
services flowing from the criminal defendant to his attorney, the
definition of "misconduct" is substantially broadened, particularly
since the Sixth Amendment "safe harbor" in 1957(f) is "extremely
limited" or non-existent according to prosecutors. 18 3 As a result,
fewer communications are protected, and some defense attorneys
are left in the precarious position of either representing clients
under the fear of possible prosecution or simply dropping cases.'
The due process guarantee of an adversarial criminal justice system requires the prosecution to prove its case without improperly
pressuring the defense.
Once a prosecutor believes a defense attorney has been
caught in the web of liability, he or she may entice the defense
attorney to inform against the client. Miami defense attorney
Neal Sonnett has remarked, "[i]f a lawyer is required to file a suspicious activity report on a client . .. then the entire client relationship has been destroyed. " 85 When a defense attorney becomes
an undercover government agent against his client, common sense
dictates that the defendant has not been given access to due process; however, the federal courts have declined to extend a per se
rule to this scenario. 86 A legal landscape that promotes secrecy
and double-speak simply encourages more secrecy and sophisticated criminal schemes; additionally, it promotes ethical violations."' More importantly, it decreases a criminal defendant's
of the Sixth Amendment is . .. privacy of communication with counsel."); see also
Abramovsky, supra note 7, at 694.
182. See Abramovsky, supra note 7, at 694.
183. See United States Attorneys' Manual, supra note 84, § 9-105.600; see also
David E. Rovella, Defense Bar FearsJail Over Tainted Fees, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 8, 2002,
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/articlejsp?id=1019508858211 ("Defense lawyers
like Howard M. Srebick ... say prosecutors are now going even further, arguing that
even if a defense lawyer didn't know his fees were tainted, a showing of 'deliberate
ignorance' on his part could be sufficient.").
184. See Rovella, supra note 183.
185. Id.
186. See United States v. Ofshe, 817 F.2d 1508, 1515-16 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding
that defendant was not prejudiced by law enforcement's placing of a 'body bug" on his
attorney and monitoring inculpatory conversations and that this practice was not so
outrageous as to violate the Fifth Amendment); see generally Abramovsky, supra note
7 (arguing that Ofshe has opened the door to similar prosecutorial tactics across the
United States).
187. See Abramovsky, supra note 7, at 706 (pointing out that the ABA Model Code
of Professional Conduct clearly prohibits defense attorneys from misrepresenting
their government-informer status to their client and from divulging information
protected by privilege to the government without the client's consent.).
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confidence that a defense lawyer is truly a zealous advocate, when
in fact a defense counsel should be the guardian of due process.
Lastly, the insertion of civil law fictions into the criminal law
necessarily violates due process since criminal law should be carefully crafted to prevent constitutional abuses under the due process clause. In rem forfeiture's mechanics have been inserted into
in personam forfeiture via pre-conviction restraining order provisions."' 8 In rem forfeiture relies on the assumption that the property itself, quite apart from its owner, is guilty and that the state
must take or restrain it for the public safety and welfare. 189
Nearly all property in the United States and other capitalist
locales are owned by individuals or corporations (legally individuals), and this deprivation in property directly punishes the owner.
Just as we would cast aside a law stating: "the government shall
satisfy that a criminal defendant has committed this crime by a
preponderance of evidence," it is equally misguided to extend civil
procedural rules relating to forfeiture extending to the criminal
law. Even the United States Attorneys' Manual recognizes that
human parties are connected to, and punished in conjunction
with, their property."' Further, the "innocent owner" and "bona
fide purchaser" provisions implicitly recognize the alternative:
there is a guilty owner, or illegitimate purchaser at which the forfeiture laws are directed.'
The courts have allowed a fiction that
belittles basic property rights despite due process concerns to aid
the government in the war on drugs and violence. The Fifth (and
Fourth) Amendments were ratified because the framers and the
states valued the connection between people and their property,
and the importance of preventing invasive governmental intrusions on personal property rights.

188. See supra Part II.A.
189. See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 638 n.5
(1989), (Blackmun, J., dissenting)('The theory (or, more properly, the fiction)
underlying civil forfeiture is that the property subject to forfeiture is itself tainted by
having been used in an unlawful manner . . .. Criminal forfeiture, in contrast, is
penal in nature: it is predicated on the adjudicated guilt of the defendant, and has
punishment of the defendant as its express purpose . . . . Where the purpose of
forfeiture is to punish the defendant, the Government's penal interest are weakest
when the punishment also burdens third parties.").
190. See United States Attorneys' Manual, supra note 84, § 9-113.106 ("The
government may conclude a civil forfeiture action in conjunction with the criminal
charges against the defendant which provided the cause of action against the
property.") (emphasis added).
191. See supra Part LI.B.
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Fourth Amendment Seizure

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
requires that
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 92
Forfeiture is sezr.9 Fair probable cause adversarial hearings
should precede all pre-conviction forfeitures of a defendant's property in order to ensure the reasonableness that the Fourth
Amendment unequivocally mandates. Professor Bascuas recently
set forth that pre-conviction forfeiture should be challenged on
Fourth Amendment grounds, even though the battle has previously been fought, as in Monsanto, Caplin & Drysdale, and Bissell
on a Sixth Amendment field.' 94 Bascuas's argument pinpoints the
anomaly that even though "the government cannot remove an
allegedly obscene book from circulation before proving that it is
obscene, under current law it can prevent an accused from using
contested assets to fund his defense with little more than an allegation." 9 ' In pre-conviction forfeiture scenarios, a defendant
should at least be granted the same procedural protections uniformly offered in seizure hearings. Additionally, focusing on forfeiture as seizure limits forfeitable property to that which is
evidence of a crime, thus limiting the expansive reach of forfeiture
allowed under the facilitation theory. The lack of a considerable
shift into this area in the law is due in large part to the error of
defense attorneys who have framed the issue within the Sixth
Amendment; then again, hindsight is 20/20. Courts have likely
viewed this approach as a self-interested fee-grab, instead of placing attention back where it should be, on the rights of the accused.
D.

Sixth Amendment Counsel

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
requires that "[iln all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
192.

U.S. CONST.

amend. IV.

193. See, e.g., Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992) (defining seizure as a
meaningful government interference with an individual's possessory interest in
property).
194. See Bascuas, supra note 11, at 1162.
195. Id. at 1163.
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enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence."'
Since the Sixth Amendment, as properly interpreted
through original intent, protects the right to choice of counsel for
those with means, modern forfeiture and money laundering law
violates this basic right, the very backbone of the American adversarial system. Despite an obligation to interpret and carefully
consider the constitutionality of federal statutes, in Monsanto, the
majority refused to recognize the right to counsel's special status.' Adopting a balancing test, the ultimate tool for a justice
whose ultimate decision precedes impartial analysis, the majority
concluded that "we find that a pretrial restraining order does not
arbitrarily interfere with a defendant's fair opportunity to retain
counsel." 9 8
The disagreement between the five-member majority and the
civil libertarians challenging the forfeiture laws in Monsanto and
Caplin & Drysdale splintered on deference to the relation back
fiction. In reality, pre-conviction forfeiture disrupts a presumptively innocent defendant's right to counsel of choice by restricting
access to presumptively legitimate assets. However, utilizing the
fiction, the majority reasoned that a defendant has no right to use
someone else's (the government's) assets to hire counsel."99 The
framers of the Constitution primarily intended to protect the right
to choice of counsel: "the colonists would have been shocked at the
notion that a defendant could be deprived of the right to retain his
own counsel and instead ordered to stand trial with counsel
appointed by the court." 00 Zenger, a case involving a colonial publisher accused of printing and distributing libelous anti-govern196.

U.S. CONST.

amend. VI.

197. See United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 609 (1989) (reasoning that since
the text of section 853 does not contain exemptions for "stock broker's fees, laundry
bills, or country club memberships" we should not attach any special significance to
the omission of "attorney's fees" from the statutory text); but see U.S. CONST. amend.
VI (containing no reference to stock broker's fees, laundry bills, or country club
memberships, yet guaranteeing the right to counsel); see also McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) ("[We [the Court] must never forget, that it is a
constitution we are expounding.").
198. Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 616 (internal quotation omitted).
199. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 626 (1989) ("A
defendant has no Sixth Amendment right to use another person's money for services
rendered by an attorney . . . . [Tihe Government does not violate the Sixth
Amendment if it seizes the . .. proceeds and refuses to permit the defendant to use
them to pay for his defense.').
200. See Winick, supra note 14, at 786-800 (analyzing the historical origins of the
right to counsel). All further footnotes in this paragraph are derived from Winick's
article.
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ment newspapers, specifically against the governor, offers an
originalist glimpse into the right to counsel. 01 The offended governor intervened by personally appointing both a judge and Zenger's
defense counsel. When Zenger's counsel of choice, Andrew Hamilton, appeared instead of the appointed lawyer, the judge was
"startled" but permitted Hamilton's argument on the fundamental
right to speak out against tyranny and censorship. 0 The judge's
permission of Hamilton to represent and argue on behalf of Zenger
suggests that colonists valued counsel of choice and free speech,
and aimed to prevent one-sided "mock" trials.
In Flanagan, the Court reasoned that the right to choice of
counsel "reflects constitutional protection of the defendant's free
choice independent of concern for the objective fairness of the pro-

ceeding.12 3 The right to choice of counsel has needlessly receded
ever since Gideon, which intended to supplement the right to
counsel by affording certain defendants appointed counsel, not
supplant the right to choice of counsel for those with means. 0 '
This confused modern conception is typified by Justice Rehnquist
in Wheat: "the essential aim. . . is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a
defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he
prefers." 0 ' The right to appointed counsel and counsel of choice
need not be mutually exclusive, but there is a danger that the
right to appointed counsel will swallow the right to choice of counsel since the right to appointed counsel is more commonly discussed, exercised, and litigated. Justice Blackmun, in the
Monsanto and Caplin & Drysdale dissent, struck the right chord,
harkening back to the same values espoused in Zenger: "[tihat the
majority implicitly finds the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of
choice so insubstantial that it can be outweighed by a legal fiction
demonstrates . .. its apparent unawareness of the function of the
201. See Paul Finkelman, The Zenger Case: Prototype of a Political Trial, in
AMERICAN POLICAL. TRIALs

21, 22-24 (Michal R. Bellknap ed., 1981).

202. See id. at 30-40.
203. Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 267-68 (1984).
204. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1963) (holding that indigent
defendants in criminal prosecutions shall be granted the right to assistance of
counsel, without addressing an evisceration of the right to counsel of choice for those
with means).
205. See, e.g., Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988) (holding that the
courts must recognize the Sixth Amendment presumption in favor of right to counsel
of choice, but the presumption may be overcome by a judicial determination of a
conflict of interest). interestingly enough, Wheat, issued the same year as Caplin &
Drysdale, and Monsanto, contained the same exact justice split, with the four
dissenters holding a more robust understanding of the Sixth Amendment.
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independent lawyer as a guardian of our freedom.""' 6 Lastly, the
Supreme Court's uncertainty as to the confines and history of the
right to counsel leads to gross misapplication of the 1957(f) right
to counsel exemption.
The Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel
has two prongs: deficiency and prejudice. 0 To reverse a conviction, a defendant must demonstrate that counsel was deficient
(that counsel was not an effective legal advocate) and that he was
prejudiced (the outcome of the case was affected by deficient counsel) .208 Broad leeway is given to defense counsel's strategic decisions and claims are most often directed at overworked appointed
counsel - ineffective assistance of counsel claims rarely prevail.
Petitioner Monsanto argued that denial of counsel of choice
resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel. 0 9 By applying the
modern conception of the right at the expense of the original
meaning, Justice White did not properly entertain defendants'
argument, responding that appointed counsel is not necessarily
ineffective .2 0" An incomplete understanding of the right to counsel
allowed the Monsanto majority to sidestep a coherent argument
firmly rooted in the Sixth Amendment.
E.

First Amendment Speech

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution
requires that "Congress shall make no law .. , abridging the freedom of speech.""' Criminal defendants are guaranteed the right
to free speech. This right is of ultimate importance to a criminal
defendant trying to defend him or herself. In the critical forum of
a courtroom, all criminal defendants hold a First Amendment
206. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 644 (1989)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (internal quotation omitted).
207. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
208. See id.
209. See NACDL Brief, supra note 42, at 23-36 (supporting, with federal precedent,
the premise that denial of counsel of choice leads to ineffective assistance of counsel,
not because public defenders are ineffective, but because the choice was denied); see
also Wilson v. Mintzes, 761 F.2d 275, 286 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that when the
government unreasonably denied defendant counsel of choice, prejudice is presumed
and may lead to a constitutional violation).
210. See United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 614 (1989); see also Caplin &
Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624-34 (1989) (avoiding
Monsanto and Caplin & Drysdale's arguments that denial of counsel of choice results
in ineffective counsel by arguing that this would mean indigents would have built-in
ineffective assistance of counsel claims against appointed counsel, leading to absurd
results).

211.

U.S. CONST.

amend. L.
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right for their counsel to serve as a mouthpiece during this meaningful interaction with the government. When counsel of choice is
deprived, the First Amendment freedoms of speech and expression
should therefore apply, triggering "exacting scrutiny review.""' 2
F.

Eighth Amendment Fines

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution
requires that "[elxcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
Since recent in rem cases have revived the
fines imposed ...
long idle prohibition against excessive fines, this concept should
be extended to in personam criminal forfeiture as well. A fine has
been defined by the Court as a "payment to a sovereign as punishment for some offense." 1 ' When assets allegedly related to a
crime are transferred from a person to the government before
adjudication by plea or conviction, the transfer should therefore be
viewed as a "fine." Forfeiture as a result of money laundering
depends on the use of "facilitation theory" - that otherwise clean
assets are used to facilitate the concealment of tainted funds and
that the clean funds are therefore forfeitable . 2 5" This theory has
also been used in the civil forfeiture context. For example, in
Calero-Toledo, a case involving the forfeiture of a yacht upon law
enforcement's retrieval of trace marijuana for personal use, the
Supreme Court ruled that the entire yacht was forfeitable on the
ground that it was connected to drug activity. 2 6 The Eleventh Circuit has similarly ruled that "a vehicle is subject to forfeiture no

matter how small the quantity of contraband found.121 ' The rule is

"admittedly harsh," but the Sixth Circuit also allowed the forfeiture of a new Mercedes upon the discovery of the remains of four
marijuana "cigarettes" on the dashboard. 1 In the context of
money laundering offenses, federal courts have ruled that property facilitating money laundering offenses through concealment
may be forfeited, despite a lack of the word "facilitate" within the
criminal forfeiture statute. What is worse, forfeiture may be
212. See Winick, supra note 14, at 829-30 (pointing out that while the First
Amendment protects political speech, it is also in effect in courtrooms to protect a
defendant's ability to hire counsel of choice).

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
1984).
218.

U.S. CONST.

amend. VIII.

Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 622 (1993) (citation omitted).
See supra Part II.A.
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 665 (1974).
United States v. One 1982 28' Int'l Vessel, 741 F.2d 1319, 1322 (11th Cir.
United States v. One 1975 Mercedes 280S, 590 F.2d 196, 198 (6th Cir. 1978).
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ordered, even in the absence of any wrongdoing by the party connected to the property. 1
There has, however, been a movement by original intent justices to grant legal substance to the Eighth Amendment: that the
people should be protected from a government that imposes excessive fines. 2 ' In 1990, petitioner Lyle Austin's body shop and
mobile home were forfeited through an in rem section 881 forfeiture action because the defendant was allegedly dealing cocaine
out of his body shop."2 ' Considering Austin's challenge, the Court
determined that the first relevant question was whether the forfeiture constituted "punishment." 2 ' By focusing on the real life
effects of the forfeiture, the majority determined this did constitute a punishment, a term not limited to criminal cases. 2 ' The
Austin opinion relied on historical forfeiture cases from the common law to support that forfeiture was, and has always been,
intended to punish the owner, not the "property," thereby demystifying the in rem fiction. 2 Relying on legislative history, the
Court opined that "Congress recognized 'that the traditional criminal sanctions of fine and imprisonment are inadequate to deter or
punish the enormously profitable trade in dangerous drugs. 2
Since Congress explicitly stated that forfeiture was a "sanction"
intended to "punish" crime, forfeiture is a fine, and defense counsel would be wise to consider creative arguments regarding
"4excess" to bring the Eighth Amendment to the forefront in representing a forfeiture client. After all, whether or not the fine is
"texcessive"'is determined by a non-formulaic proportionality analysis, giving litigants ample leeway in argument. 2
219. See, e.g., United States v. All Monies ($477,048.62) in Account No. 90-3617-3,
754 F. Supp. 1467, 1473 (D. Haw. 1991) ("Because the property is the wrongdoer,
forfeiture can be ordered even in the absence of any wrongdoing by the claimnt....
any property . .. [that] facilitates that [illegal] activity is forfeitable.').
220. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 609 (1993).
221. Id. at 604-05.
222. Id. at 609-10.
223. See id. at 6 14-23.
224. See id. at 615-16 ("The fiction that 'the thing is primarily the offender,'. . . has
a venerable history in our case law . . .. Yet the Court has understood this fiction to
rest on the notion that the owner who allows his property to become involved in an
offense has been negligent.").
225. Id. at 620; (quoting S. REP. No. 98-225, at 191 (1983)).
226. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998) ("The touchstone of
constitutional inquiry under the Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of
proportionality: The amount of the forfeiture must bear some relationship to the
gravity of the offense . . . .)
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THE CANADrIAN IMPACT

Background: the CanadianLegal System

It is next appropriate to consider the deleterious effects current American forfeiture law has had on Canada. In the past ten
years, Canadian provinces have adopted the many questionable
features of American forfeiture law, even though the Canadian
legal system is structured quite differently than its neighbor to
the south. Cloaked in the common law tradition and navigating a
power balance between local and federal legal powers, the Canadian legal system does have similarities with the United States."2 '
However, in the Canadian federalism construction, the criminal
law is clearly delegated to the federal government, whereas civil
and property law is left exclusively to the provinces. 2 ' There
exists a movement for uniformity in Canadian civil law, and Ontario has typically served as the focal point of legal change within
Canada. Ontario, in turn, tends to look for guidance from and conformity with the outside world. 2 ' Unlike the closed system
employed in the United States, Canadian courts often rely on
international precedent, primarily from Britain and the United
States, as well as international treaties."' Although still technically connected to Great Britain, The British North America Act of
1867 granted Canada leeway in crafting its own laws, and in 1982
the Canadian Charter of Rights of Freedoms ("the Charter") was
enacted, containing striking similarities with the American Bill of

Rights .23 1 The Charter enumerates guaranteed freedoms, includ227. See, e.g., Price E-mail, supra note 137 (offering background on Canadian law).
228. See id.; Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. Ch. 3 (U.K.), as reprinted in
R.S.C., No. 5, §§ 91, 92 (Appendix 11 1985) [hereinafter Canadian Division of Powers]
("(91). ... [Tlhe exclusive Legislative Authority of the Parliament of Canada extends
to all Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated...
The Criminal Law, except the Constitution of Courts of Criminal Jurisdiction, but
including the Procedure in Criminal Matters. . . . (92). In each Province the
Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to Matters coming within the
Classes of Subjects hereinafter enumerated; that is to say . . .. Property and Civil
Rights in the Province. . .. The Administration of Justice in the Province, including
the Constitution, Maintenance and Organization of Provincial Courts . . . . [t~he
Imposition of Punishment by Fine, Penalty or Imprisonment for enforcing any Law of
the Province made in relation to any Matter coming within any of the Classes of
Subjects enumerated in this Section.").
229. See Price E-mail, supra note 137.
230. See, e.g., R. v. Oakes, [19861 1 S.C.R. 103, at para. 50, 54 (Can.) (relying on
American due process and presumption of innocence and on the European Convention
on Human Rights on the presumption of innocence, respectively). Canadian Supreme
Court cases are available, free of charge, at http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/.
231. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, §7, Part I of the Constitution
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ing "the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the
right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the
principles of fundamental justice" within section 7 of the Charter,
similar to the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 3 Additionally, section 10 states that "[elveryone has the right on arrest
or detention . .. to retain and instruct counsel without delay and
to be informed of that right," analogous to the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel of choice. 3
Although Charter Rights are guaranteed, the sovereign may
put reasonable restrictions on these rights through section 1.234
When a party claims that a Charter freedom has been infringed,
Canadian courts apply the "Oakes Test." Oakes involved a successful challenge to a statute that stated simple possession of
drugs necessarily led to a presumption of full blown trafficking.
The Canadian Supreme Court ruled that this violated section
11(d), presumption of innocence; just as such a provision would
likely violate American Due Process. 3 Once a challenger has
demonstrated that the Charter has been violated, the burden
shifts and the Crown must prove by a "preponderance of the
probabilities" that 1) the purpose of the measure constraining the
Charter right is sufficiently important and consistent with a free
and democratic society; 2) the means chosen to constrain the
Charter right are proportional; and 3) there is proportionality
between the effects and purposes of the measure. 3 Since current
Canadian forfeiture laws are provincial and therefore technically
civil in scope, the Canadian courts have not been given the opportunity to fully consider the Charter rights implicated by forfeiture
in the criminal context, which like the American Bill of Rights is
heightened for criminal defendants.

Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.) [hereinafter
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms]; see also Price E-mail, supra note 137
(offering background on Canadian law).
232. Charter of Rights and Freedoms, supra note 231.
233. Id. § 10.
234. Id. § 1.
235. Compare R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (Can.) (holding that § 8 of the
Narcotic Control Act violated the Charter of Rights and Freedoms), with Sandstrom v.
Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 521 (1979) (holding that a jury instruction that the law
presumes that a person intends the natural consequences of their actions is either a
burden shifting or conclusive presumption, violating the due process requirement
that the state prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt).
236. R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, para. 63-71 (Can.).
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B. ProvincialForfeiture Law
At the federal, criminal level, section 462.37 permits the
Crown to order a forfeiture of any "proceeds of crime" after conviction as a part of sentencing, and the court is required to order
forfeiture of any property involving criminal property or property
"connected to" the offense by a balance of probabilities. 3 If the
federal court is satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the contested assets are proceeds of crime, it may issue a forfeiture order
notwithstanding insufficient evidence linking the property to the
specific offense with which the individual has been charged. The
Canadian equivalent to American federal money laundering is
contained in section 462.31, punishing every one "who uses, [or]
transfers the possession of ...any property or any proceeds of the
property with intent to conceal or convert that property or those
proceeds, knowing or believing that all or a part of that property
or of those proceeds" originate from illegal activity. 3 Upon examination of the language and substance of this definition, it is
apparent that Canada has borrowed the American "facilitation
theory" law enforcement tool and has set mens rea at "knowingly,"
as in the United States . 2 ' Further, the government may seek a
pre-conviction restraint on a defendant's assets. Lastly, the Canadian money laundering statute contains no express section 10
right to counsel provision; such an exemption would have little
effect as the right to counsel is substantively narrow in Canada. 4
It was not until December 2001 that Ontario, following the
enforcement lead of other common law countries, began utilizing
"civil" forfeiture with the Civil Remedies Act of 2001 ("CRA"I).2 4'
The CRA aimed to cripple organized crime, marijuana grow
houses, and urban blight. 4 The CRA borrows heavily from Amer237. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 462.37 (1985) (Can.); see also Kevin E.
Davis, The Effects of Forfeiture on Third Parties, 48 MCGILL L.J. 183, 186-87 (2003)
(offering an assessment of recent Canadian forfeiture legislation from a Canadian
perspective).
238. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 462.31 (1985) (Can.).
239. See supra Part II.C (discussing "knowing" mens rea).
240. See, e.g., R. v. Prosper, [1994]13 S.C.R. 236 (Can.) (indicating that there is no
Canadian uniform right to appointed counsel and the right does not extend far beyond
the requirement that police notify' a person that they have a right to seek counsel
after an arrest); Price E-mail, supra note 137 ("It is my understanding that any
substantive right to counsel [in Canada] is very very limited.").
241. Civil Remedies Act, supra note 8.
242. See MINISTRY OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL. OF ONTR~IO, CwVIL FORFEITURE IN
ONTARIO 2007. AN..UPDATE ON THE CIVIL REMEDIES ACT', 2001, (2007) [hereinafter
Ontario Forfeiture Update], available at http://www.attorneygeneraljus.gov.on.ca/
englishlaboutlpubs/20070824-CRIAKUpdate.pdff
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ican federal forfeiture law in order to emulate American law
enforcement's successes."' 3 The stated purposes of the CRA are to
compensate victims of unlawful activity, prevent violators from
retaining ill-gotten property and prevent further injury arising
from forfeited property. 4 Under the Act, "[elxcept where it would
clearly not be in the interests of justice, the court shall make an
order [of forfeiture] if the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the property is proceeds of unlawful
activity.""' Another section outlines similar forfeiture procedures
for "instruments of unlawful activity," requiring that the government prove that property was "used to engage in unlawful activity
that, in turn, resulted in the acquisition of other property or in
serious bodily harm to any person
*"246 Parties challenging
civil forfeiture may file a motion that reasonable legal expenses
are paid out of the property. 2 7 Granting a party's interlocutory
motion for legal expenses is purely discretionary. Further, a
"responsible owner" (similar to the American "innocent owner"~ or
"bona fide purchaser"), may move to recoup lost property, and the
court must honor that motion upon a finding of credibility. 4
Although Canadian civil forfeiture arguably intrudes on the federal domain, it exemplifies "double aspect" provincial law, which

touches, but is not classified as, criminal law .24 ' This arguably
unconstitutional phenomenon seems to linger when the federal
government is complicit with provincial intrusions into the federal, criminal domain. This feature is not so different from the
greatly increased federal criminal power after RICO's passage:
federalism problems are not "problems" when the federal and local
governments share crime-fighting interests.
Ontario's Attorney General issued an August 2007 report
243. Id.
244. Civil Remedies Act, supra note 8, at pt. I.
245. Id. pt. II, § 4, at 2 (emphasis added).
246. Id. pt. III, § 2.
247. Id. pt. III, § 10; E-mail from Melany Doherty, Ontario Ministry of the Attorney
General (Jan. 29, 2009, 09:16 EST) ("The Civil Remedies Act . . . is a judicially
controlled process with safeguards for legitimate and responsible owners. There are
provisions in the statute permitting access to preserved assets for legal expenses.").
248. See Civil Remedies Act, supra note 8, at pt. III, § 8(3).
249. See Canadian Division of Powers, supra note 228; see also Press Release,
Anthony Price on behalf of Farris, Vaughan, Wills & Murphy LLP, Young Farris
Associate Goes to the Supreme Court of Canada, http://www.farris.com/downloads/
ADP-Supreme_-Court -of..Canada.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2009) [hereinafter Price
Press Release] (discussing "double aspect" Canadian jurisdictional law, whereby
provincial property and civil rights law may touch issues relating to federal criminal
law).
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highlighting the successes of civil forfeiture in Canada. 5 Ontario
has established a Civil Remedies for Illicit Activities Office
("CRIA"), enforcing and organizing the province-wide forfeiture
effort. 5 Procedurally, the police submit a case outlining cause for
forfeiture to an authority within the Ontario Attorney General's
Office who next reviews the case to determine if legal requirements are met, then forwards it to the CRIA office. 52 Between
November 2003 and July 2007, the CRIA seized $3,600,000 (CAD)
through forfeiture and has frozen another $11,500,000 in property. 5 Forfeiture in Ontario and other provinces is primarily
directed at the burgeoning illegal Canadian marijuana cultivation
and distribution industry, resulting in 73% of Ontario's total forfeiture value .2 4 The release also highlights urban blight forfeiture
by mentioning the seizure of crack houses .2 5 The Canadian provinces of British Columbia, Alberta, Manitoba, and Quebec have
subsequently passed mirroring civil forfeiture legislation, virtually identical in substance to Ontario's. 5 '
There are striking similarities between Canadian "civil" forfeiture and American state and federal civil and pre-conviction
criminal forfeiture. Both mechanisms permit asset forfeiture
upon "reasonable grounds" of illegality, both aim to aid victims
and compensate the government for its efforts, and both funnel
allegedly ill-gotten gains to further new law enforcement objectives. As in the United States, there has been ample criticism by
civil libertarians in Canada. 5 Canadian critics, like their American neighbors, fear that otherwise innocent third parties, such as
landlords who rent to tenants who may misuse apartments to
grow marijuana, will suffer financially. Critics also fear the Attorney General's prediction of "exponential growth" in the area and
250. See Ontario Forfeiture Update, supra note 242; see also

MINISTRY OF PUBLIC

SAFETY AND SOLICITOR GENERAL OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, CIVIL FORFEITURE OFFICE.

A

Two-YEAR STATUS REPORT (2008) available at http://www.pssg.gov.bc.ca/publications/
docs/civilforfeitureoffice.pdf (outlining similar successes with civil forfeiture in British
Columbia, as in Ontario).
251. Ontario Forfeiture Update, supra note 242, at 3.
252. Id. at 9.
253. Id. at 10. As of the date of this publication $1.00 USD could be exchanged for
approximately $1.03 CAD.
254. Id. at 11.
255. Id.
256. See, e.g., Criminal Property Forfeiture Act, S.M., ch. 16, § 13 (2008) (Can.).
257. See, e.g., Posting of Mark Nestmann to Asset Protection Blog, http://nestmann
blog.sovereignsociety.com/2007/09/now-your-proper.html (Sept. 20, 2007, 14:56 EST)
("Policing for profit is a burgeoning enterprise in Ontario, and may soon be a reality in
most other provinces as well.").
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argue that "[t~his sets up an insidious bounty hunter mentality
where instead of focusing on preventing crime, law enforcement
agencies focus on seizing the richest, legally undefended assets
they can find.""' 8 This argument is especially persuasive in
Canada, where there is supposed to be a separation between civil
provincial and federal criminal law. 5 In Canada, instead of stopping criminals, law enforcement can take a shortcut by seizing
property; meanwhile, innocent civilians fear that the true criminal instrumentality is left on the street: the flesh and blood criminal. Perhaps the most striking distinction is that Canadian law
enforcement nearly always avoids civil forfeiture contemporaneous with a criminal proceeding; typically, civil forfeiture actions
commence only after the criminal process has been exhausted or
ignored."' This is a strategic decision by the provinces since the
validity of their forfeiture rests on its "civil" aspects. If decreed
criminal in nature, there is fear by the government that forfeited
assets will have to be returned and the laws will be struck down
as unconstitutional. 2 6'

C. Chatteijee: Civil Law by Contortion
On March 27, 2003, Robin Chatterjee was driving when Ontario police pulled him over because his car was missing a front
license plate. 6 Officers detected the odor of marijuana and
searched his car, finding a light socket, light ballast, an exhaust
fan (equipment commonly associated with growing marijuana),
and $29,020 CAD. 6 Although he was "in breach of his recogni-

zance, which required him to reside in Ottawa

'

2

1~

and there was

apparent probable cause of drug activity, police did not charge
Chatterjee with a criminal offense due to "lack of evidence," but
seized the grow equipment and cash as instruments of unlawful
activity. 6 Chatterjee challenged the seizure in the Superior
258. Id.
259. See Canadian Division of Powers, supra note 228.
260. See Price E-mail, supra note 137 ("[I]n enforcing civil forfeiture [, the
Canadian provinces] often strive to avoid concurrent civil proceeding and criminal
proceedings: they will proceed with the civil forfeiture only after the criminal process
is exhausted . . . .)
261. See Price Press Release, supra note 249.
262. Ontario v. Chatteojee, [2009] 86 O.R.3d 168, para. 2 (Can.).
263. Id.
264. See Ontario v. Chatterjee, [2009] 2009 SCC 19, para. 5 (Can.) (containing the
facts of the Chatterjee case, as recited by the Canadian Supreme Court).
265. Id. para. 5-6.
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Court"' 6 on Charter grounds; specifically sections 7 (fundamental
justice, due process equivalent), 6 ' 8 ("Everyone has the right to be
secure against unreasonable search or seizure"), 6 9 ("Everyone
has the right not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned"),"6 ' and
11(d) (presumption of innocence). 7 ' The Superior court roundly
rejected Chatterjee's Charter Rights claims, largely due to the
civil nature of the seizure . 2 7' The jurisdictional argument that the
civil forfeiture law was criminal in nature and thus ultra vires of
provincial power won the court's ear, but ultimately failed. 7
With the support of interveners, including the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association and the Canadian Criminal Lawyers' Association, Chatterjee appealed to Ontario's highest court,
the Court of Appeal for Ontario, on the grounds that provincial
forfeiture laws were ultra vires of the province's legislative powers. 17 The federal government made explicit that it did not question the jurisdictional oversteps evident in provincial forfeiture
laws, and commentators have viewed this "cooperative federalism" as the major roadblock to the jurisdictional challenge: the
Canadian federal government and the Canadian provinces are
mutually motivated to raise revenue and prevent illegal activity. 74 The Court of Appeal for Ontario drew attention to the commonality of civil forfeiture legislation, and noted that striking
down provincial forfeiture law would have profound political and
administrative implications in the form of returning assets and
prohibiting effective law enforcement. 7 Common in Canadian
opinions, the court acknowledged the many successes of similar
legislation in the United States and other common law countries. 76 The court held that "there is no basis on this record to
support the submission that the CRA is a 'colourable' attempt to
266. Ontario v. Chatterjee, [2005] 138 C.R.R.2d 1 (Can.).
267. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, supra note 231, § 7.
268. See id. § 8.
269. See id. § 9.
270. See id. § 11(d).
271. See Ontario v. Chatterjee, [2005] 138 C.R.R.2d 1, para. 78 (Can.)
272. See id.
273. See Ontario v. Chatteijee, [2007] 86 O.R.3d 168, para. 3 (Can.); see also
Canadian Division of Powers, supra note 228.
274. See Janice Tibbetts, Proceeds-of-crime-law Challenge Could Cost Provinces
Millions, CANWEST NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 10, 2008, http://www.canadianjusticereview
board.cafarticle-proceeds-of crime.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2010) (quoting a British
Columbia Civil Liberties Association representative for use of the term "cooperative
federalism.").
275. See Ontario v. Chatterjee, [2007] 86 O.R.3d 168 (Can.).
276. See id.
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legislate in relation to criminal law. 7 Under Canadian law, a
law can be classified as criminal if it has a "criminal purpose

backed by a prohibition and a penalty.12 8 It is worth re-stating for

the sake of thoroughly confusing the reader that the explicit purpose of provincial legislation is to stop organized crime. 2 9" The
court further reasoned that forfeiture is not punishment since
there is no deprivation of liberty or stigma attached to forfeiture;
further, the CRA fell "squarely" within provincial power as related
to property and civil rights .2 0 Applying the all-important doubleaspect theory, the court reasoned that civil law "may intrude into
some areas that can normally be in the domain of the criminal
law, namely, promoting public peace, order, security, health and
morality" but that these effects are only "incidental to its pur-

pose ."28 ' Lastly, addressing the presumption of innocence violation argument, the court reasoned that the guilt or innocence of
the owner is irrelevant, so there was no violation. 8
There are compelling arguments to the contrary. Specifically,
consistent with the releases by the Ontario and British Columbia
Attorneys General, the legislation is aimed at stopping the drug
trade and organized crime, and those who stand to lose are the
class of citizens typically targeted in the criminal law. Although
Canadian authorities do not typically bring concurrent civil forfeiture and criminal charges but wait until after the criminal proceedings are concluded, or, as in Chatterjee, bring no criminal
charges at all, the very fact that they could proves that the types
of behavior addressed in the civil forfeiture laws are criminal. As
would be the case in most American courts unfortunately, no serious consideration was given to the fact that $29,020 CAD was
seized outside the criminal process despite the ample evidence
that it originated from the criminal activity of an individual.
Chatterjee appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada and oral
argument occurred on November 12, 2008.83 Anthony Price, counsel for intervener, the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association
(on behalf of Chatterjee), was not optimistic after oral argu277. Id. para. 21 (emphasis added).
278. Id. para. 22.
279. See, e.g., Civil Remedies Act, supra note 8; Ontario Forfeiture Update, supra
note 242.
280. See Ontario v. Chattexjee, [2007] 86 O.R.3d 168, para. 21 (Can.); see also
Canadian Division of Powers, supra note 228.
281. See id. para. 6, 31.
282. See id. para. 42
283. See Price Press Release, supra note 249.
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ment.2 " Appellants were well-equipped with law, such as Blake
and Webb, the aforementioned British cases that rejected the relation back fiction and instead recognized that criminals have at
least some possessory interest in the fruits of their alleged

crime . 2 5 Appellants also utilized the United States Supreme

Court's Austin decision, which held that forfeiture can constitute
"punishment," which is a key indicator for defining the barrier
between civil and criminal law in Canada . 2 6" The Ontario government, sharing a table with the federal government, thus symbolizing the lack of a federalism conflict, heavily relied on the
relation back fiction to justify the constitutionality of the provincial civil forfeiture laws."8 ' Again, Canadian law is heavily guided
by foreign law. The bleakest aspect of oral argument was that the
Canadian Supreme Court Justices' questions focused on social policy aspects of the legislation; this was troubling to appellants
because the federal government is in the province's corner and
striking down the legislation would likely result in the administrative nightmare of a redistribution of forfeited assets, as well as
halt a much needed flow of cash to provincial law enforcement .2 88
It was hardly a surprise when, on April 17, 2009, the Canadian Supreme Court sided with the provincial and federal government by unanimously affirming the Court of Appeal for Ontario."'
Echoing the lower court, the Canadian Supreme Court discredited
Chatterjee's case as based on "an exaggerated view of the immunity of federal jurisdiction in relation to matters of criminal that
may, in another aspect, be the subject of provincial legislation."2"'
By framing the issue as the provinces' power to regulate health
and welfare rather than focusing on the actual forfeiture mechanism and the effects on the party punished through deprivation of
property, the Canadian Supreme Court's objective to rule for the
government was a simple task. 9 Under a literal reading of this
284. See id. ("I am not that hopeful.").
285. Webb v. Chief Constable, [2000] 1 All E.R. 209 (Eng.); AG v. Blake, [2001] 1
A.C. 268 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Ch.) (Eng.).
286. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 622 (1993); see also Price E-mail,
supra note 137 ("For the [Chatterjee] case, we reviewed and relied on some of the
[United States Supreme Court] case law on the constitutionality of civil forfeiture,
namely the Ursery and Austin cases, and our Supreme Court may briefly discuss
them when the Chatterjee decision is released.").
287. See Price E-mail, supra note 137 ("The government in Chatteijee relied on the
[American] 'relation back' theory . . . .)
288. See Price Press Release, supra note 249.
289. See Ontario v. Chatterjee, [2009] 2009 SCC 19 (Can.).
290. See id. para. 2.
291. See id.
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broad-stroke reasoning, provincial power to enact and enforce
criminal law is now theoretically limitless; indeed, all criminal
activity (whether it be rape, murder, burglary etc.) results in a
societal impact affecting property, health and welfare."' 2 Eerily
similar to the Monsanto Court employing a balancing test in order
to arrive at the desired result, the Canadian Supreme Court was
enabled to do the same by asking whether the "dominant feature"
of the CRA was to advance provincial, civil objects or whether it
was more criminal-related. 9 Straddling two inconsistent paths of
reasoning, the Canadian Supreme Court conceded that civil forfeiture has a punitive effect on individuals, yet relied on the in rem
fiction which strictly separates person from property in upholding
the CRA.29 Practically speaking, counsel for Mr. Chatterjee has
"predicted a spike in forfeitures following the Supreme Court's
endorsement. 29
Although the decision unexcitingly maintained the proenforcement status quo, Chatterjee's outcome would have had
sweeping implications if the Justices decided the other way. If the
laws were held to be federal in nature and ulta vires of provincial
powers, it would have opened the door to a host of various Charter
challenges. The most promising challenge would have been rooted
in Section 7 (the due process equivalent) because the Canadian
concept of a substantive right to counsel is very limited, extending
to the duty of the police to inform a suspect that he may seek
assistance and halt investigation if the suspect exercises his
right. 9 The CRA and other provincial forfeiture statutes contain
forfeiture exemptions for access to forfeitable assets to pay legal
expenses, but the contours of these exemptions have not been considered by the Canadian courts as there have not yet been postforfeiture challenges to the right to counsel. 9 ' If the CRA had
been struck down, such a challenge would have been likely, as
criminal defense lawyers fear for their own livelihoods, just as
292. See id. para. 3.
293. See id. para. 29.
294. See id. para. 17-18, 30.
295. See Janice Tibbetts, Supreme Court OKs Confiscation by Provinces of Proceeds
of Crime, VANCOUVER SUN, Apr. 18, 2009, available at http://www.canadianalliance.
org/englishIO79-12.02.php.
296. See R. v. Prosper [1994] 3 S.C.R. 236 (Can.). It also appears that the most
promising future American challenges are rooted in due process.
297. E-mail Interview with Melany Doherty, Ontario Ministry of the Attorney
General (Jan. 29, 2009 15:12 EST) (on file with author) ("To date there have been no
challenges to right to counsel in the manner contemplated by your email.").
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American defense lawyers do .2 11 Also, as previously stated, striking down the legislation will have retroactive effects as provinces
may have to return assets to what the general public views to be
an unsavory set of characters, a political and administrative
"nightmare."' The Northern Provinces were awaiting the Canadian Supreme Court's blessing before passing similar legislation,
which should be forthcoming. Perhaps American judges can take
comfort in the fact that they do not hold a monopoly on making
results-oriented law, while casting aside clearly established constitutional principles.
V.

IF IT's BROKEN, Fix IT: AMERICAN SOLUTIONS

After having considered the constitutional and international
implications of current forfeiture and money laundering law,
there are four ways that the United States can effectively fight
money-related crime without violating defendants' fundamental
rights.
A.

Transparency and Fee Applications

If prosecutors are genuinely concerned with the rights of
criminal defendants to hire counsel, as well as the prospect of
criminal defense lawyers concealing or participating in their clients' criminal activity, there is a simple solution. Congress can
amend the federal forfeiture and money laundering laws by
requiring that defense attorneys apply monthly for reasonable
fees and expenses, detailing time and expense records and submitting the report to a neutral government-appointed trustee. Upon
the trustee's approval and under the supervision of the judge, the
defense would be allowed to secure fees and expenses from the
defendant for bona fide services. Congress would not even have to
expend much time or energy on such an amendment since this
system has already been contemplated in Federal Rule of Bank298. See Price E-mail, supra note 137 ("My contacts with criminal lawyers indicate
that they are worried about money being available to pay them due to civil forfeiture,
so perhaps a case on right to counsel will arise in the future.").
299. See Tibbetts, supra note 274 (pointing out that under Canadian law, should
Chatteijee be reversed, the government may have to refund those who were deprived
of their property from provincial forfeiture mechanisms); see also Price Press Release,
supra note 249 ("[Reversing the Chatterjee case] would be a political nightmare for
the [Supreme Court of Canada]: it would have to invalidate several immensely
popular provincial statutes . .. and it would likely have to say that criminals have a
valid possessory interest in the proceeds of their crimes.").
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ruptcy Procedure 2016.00 As in bankruptcy cases, the need for fee
transparency is apparent in large federal drug and money laundering cases, albeit for different reasons. Whereas debtor's counsel and accounting firms are under the microscope in bankruptcy
matters given the immense interest creditors have in the debtor
not wasting funds on exorbitant fees or fancy dinners, defense
attorneys should be examined to ensure that they are not filtering
funds that may become forfeitable upon conviction. It would be
reasonable in the criminal fee application context for Congress to
authorize harsh penalties against attorneys if the government can
establish that a client is actually paying an attorney more than
300. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2016 ("(a) Application for compensation or reimbursement,
An entity seeking interim or final compensation for services, or reimbursement of
necessary expenses, from the estate shall file an application setting forth a detailed
statement of (1) the services rendered, time expended and expenses incurred, and (2)
the amounts requested. An application for compensation shall include a statement as
to what payments have theretofore been made or promised to the applicant for
services rendered or to be rendered in any capacity whatsoever in connection with the
case, the source of the compensation so paid or promised, whether any compensation
previously received has been shared and whether an agreement or understanding
exists between the applicant and any other entity for the sharing of compensation
received or to be received for services rendered in or in connection with the case, and
the particulars of any sharing of compensation or agreement or understanding
therefore, except that details of any agreement by the applicant for the sharing of
compensation as a member or regular associate of a firm of lawyers or accountants
shall not be required. The requirements of this subdivision shall apply to an
application for compensation for services rendered by an attorney or accountant even
though the application is filed by a creditor or other entity. Unless the case is a
chapter 9 municipality case, the applicant shall transmit to the United States trustee
a copy of the application. (b) Disclosure of compensation paid or promised to attorney
for debtor. Every attorney for a debtor, whether or not the attorney applies for
compensation, shall file and transmit to the United States trustee within 15 days
after the order for relief, or at another time as the court may direct, the statement
required by § 329 of the Code including whether the attorney has shared or agreed to
share the compensation with any other entity. The statement shall include the
particulars of any such sharing or agreement to share by the attorney, but the details
of any agreement for the sharing of the compensation with a member or regular
associate of the attorney's law firm shall not be required. A supplemental statement
shall be filed and transmitted to the United States trustee within 15 days after any
payment or agreement not previously disclosed. (c) Disclosure of compensation paid or
promised to bankruptcy petition preparer. Every bankruptcy petition preparer for a
debtor shall fie a declaration under penalty of peijury and transmit the declaration
to the United States trustee within 10 days after the date of the filing of the petition,
or at another time as the court may direct, as required by § 110(h)(1). The declaration
must disclose any fee, and the source of any fee, received from or on behalf of the
debtor within 12 months of the filing of the case and all unpaid fees charged to the
debtor. The declaration must describe the services performed and documents
prepared or caused to be prepared by the bankruptcy petition preparer. A
supplemental statement shall be filed within 10 days after any payment or agreement
not previously disclosed.").
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the amount stated in the quarterly application. This would constitute "money laundering" in the classical section 1956 sense.
Implementation of this proposal has two possible paths: the realistic option would be to keep the current laws as they are and allow
the constitutionally questionable ex parte pre-indictment or preconviction restraining order on defendants' assets and deduct reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses therefrom. Option two, the
ideal path, would be to prohibit any pre-conviction forfeiture, but
give the government a larger role and access to financial records
and transactions between defense attorney and client.
This proposal is open to the criticism that it is at odds with
the traditional ideal of the defense lawyer, able to retain fees and
work without big government looking over his or her shoulder.
Although a government agent monitoring the private attorney client relationship so closely would limit wrongdoing, such an expansion is unprecedented and would be a tough pill for many lawyers
to swallow. After all, the right to counsel in a bankruptcy setting
is substantially narrower than the right that criminal defendants
enjoy. However, this lost privacy (and added tedium) is a necessary tradeoff and is better than the alternative: inability to retain
fees from defendants in criminal cases, leading to the extinction of
the private defense bar, or worse, criminal indictments against
real estate agents, bankers and lawyers working in good faith.
Receiving interim approval for fees and expenses in a more nonformal, non-adversarial setting is a far more efficient process than
anxiety-filled money laundering prosecution, and a tradeoff the
defense bar could learn to embrace. Moreover, the defense lawyer
need not divulge strategy or other private matters that would
jeopardize the sacred attorney-client privilege; a rough description
of the type of work and the hours spent would satisfy the disclosure requirements. As in bankruptcy proceedings, the hourly
rates paid to defense attorneys would have to be commensurate
with the rates charged by similarly situated defense firms or rates
charged by the same firm before the bankruptcy laws are
absorbed into the federal criminal law, adjusted for inflation and
market realities. The fee application process's logic in this context
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was hinted at by Professor Winick3 0 ' and Justice Blackmun"' 2 over
twenty years ago, and deserves more serious consideration.

B.

Revise and Codify Prosecutors'Manuals

The United States Attorneys' Manual sections regarding forfeiture and money laundering in connection with attorney's fees is
far from perfect, but it is more reasonable than more constricted
readings of the "bona fide purchaser" application provisions of
853(c) and the Sixth Amendment exemption of 1957(f) that certain
federal courts have adopted."' 3 Codification of a narrow set of
guidelines would hold federal prosecutors accountable if a fair and
impartial district court judge was given the power to independently analyze whether prosecutors were in fact following their
own procedures. More importantly, codification would have prophylactic effects, deterring abusive practices by law enforcement
and prosecutors.
One clearly deficient section of the manual that should be
revised and then codified is the section stating that if an attorney
becomes aware of an illegal source of funds during representation,
those fees become forfeitable. 1957's intent requirement, as well
as the manual, should be temporally adjusted to require attorney
knowledge of illegality before retention. However, retention could
be broadly construed to include all time after initial contact
between attorney and client to prevent a co-conspirator attorney
and client from transferring illegal funds post-acquaintance but
before formal engagement letters are signed. Put simply, a good
faith attorney should never be punished for simply doing due dili301. See Winick, supra note 14, at 837 ("Applying the forfeiture statutes to
legitimate attorneys' fees will not promote the predominant congressional interest
asserted in the legislative history of the 1984 amendments-the avoidance of
fraudulent transfers. So long as it can be assured that the fee paid to the attorney is a
bona fide and reasonable one, rather than a sham or fraudulent transfer designed to
avoid forfeiture, Congress'[sic] stated purpose is not frustrated. Indeed, exempting
legitimate attorneys [sic] fees from forfeiture would serve Congress' [sic] interest in
stripping drug dealers and racketeers of their 'economic power bases.'").
302. See Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. 617, 642 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[Nbo
important and legitimate purpose is served by employing § 853(c) to require
postconviction forfeiture of funds used for legitimate attorney's fees, or by employing
§ 853(e)(1) to bar preconviction payment of fees. The Government's interests are
adequately protected so long as the district court supervises transfers to the attorney to
make sure they are made in good faith. All that is lost is the Government's power to
punish the defendant before he is convicted. That power is not one the Act intended
to grant.") (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
303. See, e.g., United States v. Bissell, 866 F.2d 1343, 1349 (11th Cir. 1989).
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gence on a client's fund source or by investigating his client's
background in preparing for litigation.
In addition to the temporal adjustment of intent, which would
provide a more robust and actual constitutional attorney client
privilege, Congress should specifically state that the federal subjective "knowledge" mens rea should be applied and that a prosecutor can never "impose" knowledge of forfeitability upon a
defense attorney by simply issuing an indictment. In Monsanto,
the majority acknowledged that "it is highly doubtful that one who
defends a client in a criminal case that results in forfeiture could
prove that he was 'without cause to believe the property was subject to forfeiture."'
For an attorney, working hard on behalf of a
client in good faith and to the best of his or her ability, to risk all
fees to forfeiture based on an eventual declaration of guilt is something that the framers would simply not permit. "Reasonably
without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture""' 5 should mean bounded by reason; since adherence to the
Constitution is reasonable, the forfeiture and money laundering
laws should not prevent defense attorneys from doing their job,
and part of that job is becoming privy to, but not a part of, a client's legal problems.
Admittedly, agencies need flexible internal guidelines that
can be reconsidered, re-evaluated, or even disregarded in light of
changed circumstances and no manual can predict everything;
indeed, wholesale codification would be foolish. However, in a
sensitive area of the law with such broad potential for
prosecutorial abuse, codification is necessary to facilitate uniformity in different districts and put defense lawyers on notice of what
they can and cannot do. While it is true that no manual can predict every contingency, enough time has passed since the beginning of the war on drugs, and enough forfeiture and money
laundering proceedings have come and gone that expectations and
norms have been established in this area. Perhaps a task force
containing NACDL representatives and prosecutors could assemble and use the twenty years of experience since Monsanto and
Caplin & Drysdale to determine best practices and suggest laws
that Congress could pass to promote accountability and fair play.

304. United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 604 (1989) (citations omitted).
305. Criminal Resource Manual, supra,note 99, § 2313.
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Blanket Criminalization

If it looks like criminal law and smells like criminal law, it is
probably criminal law. The source of the problem is the insertion
of civil law concepts into an area that is more criminal than anything else; for example, the codification of the civil relation back
fiction within sections 853, 1956 and 1957. The use of in rem forfeiture concepts in criminal matters is suspicious, sidestepping
constitutional scrutiny. In a perfect world, the government would
be given an option: require the beyond a reasonable doubt standard and trigger defendant procedural protections, and thus limit
the use of forfeiture, or, keep the current system as it is but prohibit the use of forfeiture mechanisms in all cases involving a
human defendant whose liberty is at stake. Again, to prevent preconviction and post-indictment concealment by wealthy RICO
defendants, the government would still be permitted to seize a
defendant's assets after a fair adversarial probable cause hearing,
if there is a probable cause basis that such concealment will occur
or that the assets are evidence of a crime - such an action is consistent with criminal procedure.
The chief distinction between civil and criminal law is that
the former involves the deprivation of property while the latter
implicates not only a potential deprivation of property, but also
stigmatization and a loss of liberty, or even life. Even after shaking off the fictional aspects of in rem forfeiture, it could be argued,
as has the government, that forfeiture is simply a civil penalty,
resulting in a simple deprivation of property. However, this argument only scratches the surface. The focus must be on the injurious, real life burden pre-conviction forfeiture imposes on a
defendant, suddenly deprived of a constitutional right to defend
charges, through deprivation of the rights to counsel and due process. When property is forfeited and impairs a defendant's ability
to mount an effective defense, the framers' conception that property is important in its power to preserve other rights becomes all
too apparent. Moreover, since the stated purpose and effect of
pre-conviction civil forfeiture beginning in the 1980s was to regulate drug crimes, it is more proper to group the area into the criminal category; the arguments by the British Columbia Civil
Liberties Association in Chatterjee illustrated this point. Indeed,
there is little, or no distinction between the deprivation of liberty
as well as property that occurs in in personam forfeiture cases connected with criminal charges and the punishment inflicted on parties who lose their homes or vehicles via in rem proceedings. The
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unfettered right of the government to concurrently utilize criminal and civil forfeiture mechanisms against the same defendant in
the same matter grants prosecutors unfair leverage in negotiating
plea agreements and must be curtailed. Situations where human
defendants are declared not guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, but
the government is allowed to retain property due to the lowered
civil burden of proof should be disallowed as unlawful and illogical. Canadian forfeiture, in walking a jurisdictional tightrope,
does not typically allow concurrent pre-conviction forfeiture and
criminal charges upon the same defendant or in the same matter.
Such a procedure, originating from Canada's jurisdictional structure, is fairer, more productive, and clearly averts double jeopardy
problems. The confusion of criminal law in the United States in
the federal and state domain, particularly after the passage of
RICO, CCE and the MLCA has also blended the civil and criminal
law in grotesque ways and it is time to fix past wrongs.
D.

Judicial Duty

The previous three proposals involve Congress taking initiative to improve the current state of affairs. District Court judges
play a key role in interpreting the scope and application of the
Constitution when faced with bona fide fee applications or
motions to dismiss based on the 1957(f) Sixth Amendment exemption. The importance of scrupulous trial court judges should not
be understated. As Judge Cooke recently demonstrated, Caplin &
Drysdale has not sounded the death knell to the Bill of Rights in
forfeiture and money laundering matters, despite submissions of
such logic by prosecutors. Involving fees that were sought for services rendered post-conviction, Caplin & Drysdale was not factually ideal and there is a great need for the courts to look at the
merits of each case individually and develop a strong and fair body
of precedent. Monsanto's facts were also far from perfect for those
wishing to declare pre-conviction forfeiture unconstitutional; the
petitioner was perceived as a mafioso drug peddler at a time when
the war on drugs was at its peak. Perhaps it was Monsanto's
social context, during war on drugs zealotry, rather than objective
facts that were proper to fairly apply the law, that was determinative. If the Court was presented with a pre-conviction forfeiture
due process or right to counsel challenge from a non-violent securities fraud defendant rather than a perceived "bad man" like Mr.
Monsanto, there may have been a different result and the current
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state of forfeiture and money laundering law would not be as
deformed as it currently is.
With what will likely be a conservative Court for at least the
next twenty years, the justices who purport to have adopted a
more traditional, original intent-based interpretation of the Constitution have an opportunity to strike down unconstitutional
laws, such as the relation back fiction, embedded in federal forfeiture and money laundering statutes. This would unequivocally
demonstrate consistency with prior rulings, preserve the original
intent of the drafters of the Constitution and achieve neutrality in
principle. The move by originalist jurists to understand and apply
what the framers intended by the excessive fines clause of the
Eighth Amendment is a welcome example of moving in the right
direction. The Supreme Court is also invited to resolve the anomaly of why the Constitution expressly forbids any forfeiture after a
treason execution, but allows forfeiture of an entire vessel if marijuana for personal use is found aboard.
On February 23, 2009, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
in Alvarez v. Smith."'6 Below, the Seventh Circuit invalidated an
Illinois law that permitted law enforcement to seize money or
vehicles believed to be connected to drug-related crime and retain
the property for up to half a year, without even having to file a
forfeiture or criminal action, based simply on probable cause."' 7
The Seventh Circuit, in a challenge to the law involving the
seizure of automobiles, held that due process requires a procedural forfeiture mechanism that tests the validity of government
retention of the individual's property."0 ' The court calls for "some
sort of" pre-forfeiture mechanism and some level of notice to the
property owner before seizure, but does not elaborate specific

methods . 3 9 The government petitioned for certiorari asking
whether "the Due Process Clause requires a State or local government to provide a post-seizure probable cause hearing prior to a

statutory judicial forfeiture proceeding

.1310
"

The Court's deci-

306. See Smith v. City of Chi., 524 F.3d 834 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom.
Alvarez v. Smith, 77 U.S.L.W. 3457 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2009) (No. 08-351); see also Posting
of Ilya Somin to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://w-ww.volokh.com/posts/1235552
057.shtml (Feb. 25, 2009, 02:36 EST) (forecasting that "this should be an easy case"
under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process clause, yet fearing that given the
current Court and trends, that the Supreme Court will reverse the Seventh Circuit).
307. Illinois Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act, 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/1 et seq.
(2004); see Smith v. City of Chi., 524 F.3d 834, 838-39 (7th Cir. 2008).
308. See Smith, 524 F.3d at 838.
309. See id.
310. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Devine v. Smith, 129 S. Ct. 1401, pt. I (No.
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sion will likely be confined to discussing the issue of whether and
what type of hearings due process requires for government
seizures of personal property. The Court should, however, hint as
to whether the strong governmental interest that justified the
deprivation of counsel and due process in cases like Caplin &
Drysdale and Monsanto still exists today. Rarely weighing in on
the forfeiture issue, the Court should also signal whether attacking federal forfeiture and money laundering statutes on due process grounds could be a worthwhile task for future litigants.
Anyone expecting the Court to affirm the Seventh Circuit's decision should remind themselves that the Court has been steadily
chipping away at constitutional property rights.
Finally, splits between the federal circuits on important constitutional issues require further clarification by the Supreme
Court. The fact that a criminal defendant in the Ninth Circuit is
afforded heightened protections in forfeiture proceedings compared with a defendant in the Eleventh Circuit violates basic
notions of equal protection under the law and fundamental fairness. Considering inconsistencies within the circuits in regards to
protections afforded defendants through forfeiture hearings (or
lack thereof) and the extent of what constitutes dirty property
under the facilitation theory, these issues are currently ripe and
the Court will likely be given an opportunity to offer uniformity in
the circuits. Given wide variance among the circuits regarding
what hearings a forfeiture defendant deserves and to be consistent
with the Constitution's mandates, the Supreme Court must standardize, at a minimum, an adversarial probable cause seizure hearing pre-forfeiture since forfeiture is seizure. Regarding the circuit
split on facilitation theory, the prosecutor's burden to demonstrate
the connection between the property and the illegal act must be
heightened since a prosecutor should be forced to establish a real
connection between the property and the alleged crime. Perhaps a
proportionality formula can be expounded, whereby if the government can show 15% of the home or business was used to conceal
illegal funds or engage in illegal activity, 15% of the property
could be restrained until conviction, and this percentage could
change as further facts were established before conviction. Certainly, the framers would scoff at a government that seizes legitimate property. Should the Supreme Court deny certiorariif such
a question is presented, it would serve as an allowance of a wide
08-351), cert. granted sub nom. Alvarez v. Smith, 77 U.S.L.W. 3457 (U.S. Feb. 23,
2009) (No. 08-35 1).
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variance of practices within different jurisdictions. If the
Supreme Court it to be a legal, rather than political branch, it
must accept responsibility, adhere to original intent, and do what
is right. Criminal law exists primarily to protect the innocent, not
to punish the not-yet-guilty.

